Interest in its Relation to Pedagogy

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INTEREST

IN ITS RELATION TO PEDAGOGY

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TRANSLATED UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE SOCIETY FOR THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF PEDAGOGY

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PREFACE.

In both Psychology and Pedagogy there is scarcely a question of greater importance than the question of the nature and significance of "*Interest.*"

Yet there is hardly a question that is so far from a satisfactory solution or even from a conformity of opinion on its essentials as the question of interest. Some regard interest as a matter of intellect; others as a matter of feeling; others, again, as a matter of volition, and still others as a combination of these various elements.

To one person it is identical in meaning with the concept apperception; to another person it is identical in meaning with the concept attention, etc. Moreover, the definitions of interest often fall short of clearness and logical consistency,

either because contradictory factors are introduced into the concept itself, or because certain of the constituent elements of the definition do not agree with fundamental psychological premises. That not even the Herbartian School, which has given this particular subject more thorough and more devoted treatment than it usually receives, is wholly free from this charge, we think we have already proved in our work: "Die hauptsächlichsten Irrtümer der Herbartschen Psychologie." (P. 130, p. 208.)

Because of its fundamental importance in practical pedagogy, there exists an urgent need that the doctrine of interest be brought out of this confusion of views into greater clearness and uniformity. This consideration has given rise to the publication of the following monograph, which pretends to be nothing but an attempt on the author's part to contribute his modest share to the solution of the problem in question.

The first three sections of the work, namely, (1) Origin, Nature, and Kinds of Interest, (2) Importance of Interest in the Acts of Ideation and Reasoning, and (3) Importance of Interest

in Volition and Action, discuss the subject from its *psychological* side. In these sections we have entirely refrained from those *critical* examinations that we have used now and then in former writings. Our aim has been simply to give positive hints as to how, on the basis of the ruling fundamental views of psychology, a doctrine of interest might be established which should be free from contradictions, not only with those psychological premises, but also with itself.

The last section contains pedagogical conclusions and applications, which will show, by suggestion at least, where and in what manner the results of psychological researches may be turned to account in Pedagogy.

W. Ostermann.

Oldenburg, *April*, 1895.

PREFACE BY THE EDITOR.

It will be generally conceded, I believe, by all who have watched the progress of educational thought and practice in this country that American pedagogy has received great stimulation from the introduction of Herbartian ideas. Prominent among the ideas which were advocated by those teachers who had become strongly imbued with the Herbartian pedagogy from their study of education in Germany was the idea of the part that interest should assume in all instruction or teaching. This idea was widely bruited in addresses and discussions at educational gatherings, and also in articles in the educational press. It is not very wide of the mark to say that vagueness generally character-

ized the exposition of the idea. When an idea is put forth without a reasonable amount of clearness, and when at the same time it is advocated with continued assiduity, it is sure to awaken controversy. As was therefore to be expected, such advocacy did arouse a strong controversy, and some of the articles which appeared during the controversy, notably those from the pen of Dr. Wm. T. Harris, are distinct enrichments of our pedagogical literature. The controversy brought the subject very strongly to the attention of educators, and at length there came from another quarter an exposition of the doctrine of interest in the monograph by Prof. Dewey entitled "Interest as Related to Will." This monograph changed the aspect of the discussion, eliminated the idea from the field of controversy, and established, as Prof. De Garmo has said, the truth of the principle for which the Herbartians contended.

Since the publication of the monograph, however, little of any purport on the question has appeared. The question was surely not exhausted. Ampler exposition and analysis of

the idea were possible. Indeed, ampler analysis and exposition were desired by the educational public.

It is with the end in view of turning attention again to the idea of the doctrine of interest and affording American teachers new points of view from a work that is regarded in Germany as an able and scholarly discussion of interest in relation to teaching, that this translation is put forth.

EDWARD R. SHAW.

October 23, 1899.

I.

ORIGIN, NATURE, AND KINDS OF INTEREST.

Etymology of the word interest.

The word interest is derived, as is well known, from the Latin verb "interesse." Being a compound of the preposition "inter," signifying between, and the verb "esse," signifying to be, its original and proper meaning is "*to be between*" in space. Used impersonally—*mea*, *tua*, *etc.*, *interest*, signifying *it is of my*, *your interest*—the word came to have in Latin also the figurative meaning: *it is of consequence to me*, *I attach importance or value to a thing*. In this sense the word was adopted in the German language. That a thing is of interest to us should mean and actually does mean, in spite of all the varying definitions, nothing else in the ruling usage of language of the present time than that we attach *value* to the thing.

We shall have the less occasion to depart from this meaning, which is sanctioned by tradition, if we remember the term generally used as its opposite. *Herbart* has correctly stated—and every one, no matter how he may otherwise define the word, must agree with him—that interest is contrary to the idea of "*indifference.*"

Interest as consciousness of value.

Whatever interests us is, just so far as it does so, not indifferent to us; and in the same degree whatever is indifferent to us does not interest us. That a thing is not indifferent to us means, when positively expressed, certainly nothing else than that it is of some value to us; or to state this still more precisely, that we are somehow *conscious* of its worth—that we *value* it. Setting aside for the present any more definite psychological interpretation and conceiving its meaning in the broadest sense, we may define interest as *consciousness of value*, or recognition of value.

Interest as source of volition and action.

The observation that, as a rule, the valuation of a thing influences in some way our volition and our action has caused to be included in the conception of interest, besides the idea of con-

sciousness of worth, the idea of a corresponding trend of the will; so that the word has thus acquired the further significance of "devotion to a thing, or active participation in it." Inasmuch as our active effort and volition, or we may say our actions, are most intimately connected with our consciousness of value, we may not altogether reject this definition. Since, however, it is not advisable, without a forcible reason, to deviate from the etymological significance of words, and since, on the other hand, the two psychological phenomena, in spite of their intimate causative relation, are still too diverse in their nature to be included in one simple conception, without logical and psychological objections, we therefore prefer to adhere to the definition already given: viz., that interest is consciousness or appreciation of value. The related phenomena, then, of effort and volition we do not conceive as elements of the concept interest, but as its necessary *consequences*; and as such they will receive closer consideration in a later chapter.

Significance of words followed.

Positive and negative interest.

At first thought it may seem that we should call that state of mind interest only in cases

where we become conscious of the *positive value* of a thing, that is, its excellence, worth, usefulness, etc.; in other words, when we take pleasure in it. In reality, however, those cases which are of an opposite nature belong here, namely, instances where we feel *repulsed* by a thing, or become conscious of its *want of value* —this term being used not in the sense of "indifference" but in the sense of displeasure, aversion. Think, for instance, of the lively interest that may be aroused in us at the sight of an evil deed or by the news of a disaster that closely concerns us. We shall therefore have to distinguish two types of interest, a *positive* and a *negative* one. The former is present whenever we take pleasure in an object or feel attracted to it on account of its positive value; the latter is present whenever an object, because of its *want of value*, in the sense already given, displeases, or repels us. Between these two poles, the *positive* and the *negative* interest, lies the field of the *indifferent*, which neither pleases nor displeases, neither attracts nor repels. Positive interest, as will be shown later on, causes an effort to reach that which has ex-

cited it; negative interest causes an effort to avoid the same. The indifferent, on the other hand, exercises no influence whatever on our effort and volition.

Up to this point we have done little more than reach an understanding as to the meaning of the term "interest." We shall now have further to inquire how this consciousness of value, which we have for the present defined interest to be, may be explained *psychologically*.

Interest, originally a matter of feeling.

Upon a closer examination of the psychical process which underlies interest, it can clearly be seen that all valuation is *originally* a matter of *feeling*. Feeling is the faculty of valuation in the mind; without feeling there is no consciousness of value. However much our opinions may differ as to the nature of feeling, in this point all views will agree, that our mind, in every state of pleasure, experiences, or at least thinks it experiences, some satisfactory advancement; in every state of pain, some hindrance; and that it is unable to become conscious of these advancements or hindrances as such in any other way than through feeling. From this very consideration feeling proves to be the only

factor of valuation of our mind; for no reason can be found why impressions should appear to the mind as valuable or as worthless other than that, according as they afford pleasure or pain, the mind experiences through them an advancement or a hindrance of its life.

Feeling the standard of valuation.

It may be admitted that irrespective of this subjective valuation by the mind, things possess in themselves intrinsic or objective value; but these things assume no value for us personally unless we become conscious of it by the medium of feeling. Indeed, it cannot be denied that the mature mind is able, by means of its reasoning powers, to discriminate between value and absence of value; but the mind would be devoid of every sense for value-relations, and consequently could not so discriminate, if it had not previously experienced through its *feeling* the value or want of value of things, and could now recall these experiences.

Imagine a mind that applies itself exclusively to ideating and reasoning, that has had, from the beginning of its existence, no feeling whatever of pleasure or displeasure. Such a mind would be totally indifferent to all outer events

and inner experiences; nothing would seem to it valuable or worthless, nothing important or unimportant, but everthing simply *real.*

We shall now work out in its details the proposition that all interest is based upon feeling.

Sensuous interests.

First, let us call attention to the *sensuous* interests, which, reigning almost exclusively during the first stages of existence, still exert great influence in mature life, and in many cases control both volition and action. Examples are the interest in eating and drinking, in exercise and rest, in pain and sensuous pleasure, in health and sickness, etc. All these interests depend entirely on the *sensuous feelings* of like and dislike, of pleasure and displeasure. If hunger caused no pain, and if the taking of food or drink did not afford satisfaction, if health were not associated with feelings of pleasure, or illness with feelings of pain; in short, if all these sensuous advantages and disadvantages did not perceptibly manifest themselves through feelings of pleasure and displeasure, they would, naturally, leave us totally indifferent, they would be unable to rouse in us any interest, any consciousness of value whatever, either in the

positive or in the negative sense. It is only through feeling and in feeling that they arouse our interest, please or displease us, attract or repel us, become blessing or bane for us.

Interest in wealth.

Or let us consider the interest in wealth which, unfortunately but undeniably, plays so enormous a part in the life of mankind. Here the relation to feeling is not quite so apparent, still it exists in the self-same manner. Undoubtedly the reason why money is so highly esteemed is that by means of it so many advantages, enjoyments, and pleasures of life can be obtained, and, on the other hand, so many disadvantages, pains, and discomforts can be avoided. But it needs no proof to show that all these blessings and banes are comprehended as such only through feelings of pleasure and displeasure. Imagine these feelings lacking in the life of the mind, and any interest in such advantages and disadvantages, and consequently in money itself, becomes inconceivable.

Higher interests, rooted in feelings.

Moreover, the *higher* interests of human life —such as interest in investigation and knowledge, interest in the welfare and misery of our fellow men, all the æsthetic, ethical, and re-

ligious interests are rooted wholly in our feelings.

Every act of clear and true knowledge, every consciousness of mental advancement or of an increase of our knowledge and insight, is associated with a feeling of pleasure; just as, on the other hand, every hindrance of our reasoning activity, every consciousness of some want of knowledge or insight is associated with a feeling of displeasure. Although these feelings may sometimes be too subtle to rise clearly into our consciousness, yet in every case they may be discovered upon a close introspection. In these feelings, which are designated "intellectual feelings," because they accompany the activity of the intellect, lies, or at any rate upon them is based, all genuine interest in investigation and knowledge. All "genuine" interest we say, and by that we mean the interest which originates in the thing itself, which delights in knowledge for its own sake irrespective of other possible *ends* that it may serve. It cannot be denied that knowledge is esteemed either from thoughts of gain and honor, or in respect of its use to our fellow men, or from

Intellectual Interest.

other remote considerations. Such secondary interests, however, must not be mistaken for "intellectual" interest, and must not be traced back, like the latter, to the intellectual feeling, but rather to other feelings, such as sensuous feelings, the sense of honor, sympathetic feeling, etc.

Sympathetic interest.

The interest in the *welfare* and *misery* of our fellow men is based on the sympathetic feelings of participation in sorrow and joy. The haps and mishaps of our fellow beings affect us, not only because we perceive them theoretically, placing ourselves, through our imagination, in like situations, but also because the woes and joys of our fellow men re-echo more or less vividly in our own hearts, and thus become our own woes and our own joys. This reaction is the very source of that sympathetic interest, which is of so deep significance as being the key to the closest understanding of our fellow men, the most powerful magnet in human social life, the most effective stimulus to active charity.

Æsthetic, ethical, and religious interest.

In like manner the *æsthetic*, *ethical*, and *religious* interests entirely depend on corresponding feelings. He who has never *felt* for himself the beauty of music, or is utterly incapable

of feeling it, may possibly be able to talk about it and may believe in its charm from the statements of others; but such an opinion is one accepted merely upon external authority; in other words, it is a *dead belief*, not real *interest.* In this case, as well as in all others, interest unconditionally presupposes a personal experience—that is, a perception and feeling of one's own. A person may be ever so well informed on religious and ethical matters; he may have heard them extolled ever so often, and may in good faith even have praised them himself; but if he has never been affected in his own *feeling* by the value of these highest things, if he himself has never felt delight in the good and abhorrence of evil, if the greatness and goodness of God have never moved his heart, if God's splendor in nature, if His spirit in Holy Writ have never appealed to his heart, it is out of the question for him to have interest in these things. Such interest cannot be taught or learned from without; the poet's word holds good here: "You'll ne'er attain it, save you know the feeling." *

* From Bayard Taylor's Translation of "Faust."

Secondary interests.

It is true that there is also an interest in these things which does not spring from the thing itself, which esteems æsthetic, moral, and religious things not for their own sake, but from selfish ends which they may serve; yet these are only *secondary interests*, which must clearly be distinguished from the interests with which we are dealing at present. And after the preceding exposition it requires no further argument to show that these secondary interests also may be traced back respectively to their related feelings.

To show that this view of the matter is also held by others, we make a few short citations from the writings of well-known authorities on modern psychology:

Lotze quoted.

"Just as it is a fundamental property of the mind not only to be subjected to changes, but also to become aware of them through perception, so it is just as much one of its original features not only to perceive these changes, but also to become conscious of their value through the pleasure or displeasure which they produce." "Our feeling is the light in which the objective excellency of things is truly revealed to us."

"Morality, instead of springing up as a subordinate adjunct solely through the exercise of our ideating activity, is, on the contrary, based upon *feeling*, which indicates the true nature of our mind far more properly than does knowledge." "The æsthetic judgments of approbation and disapprobation, as: 'this pleases' and 'that displeases,' are judgments or propositions in form only; that which is expressed through them is no longer an act of reasoning, but a feeling of pleasure or displeasure." (Lotze, Mikrokosmos, 3. Auflage, I, 269 ff; Grundzüge der praktischen Philosophie, 2. Auflage, S. 12).

Horwicz quoted.

"Feeling is, and always will be, the main source of all mental activity, and however far our highly developed culture may attempt to divorce recollection and reasoning from feeling, the former still remain distinguishable in their nature as reactions of feeling." "There is no desire which has not a feeling for its basis." "A mediating factor is required to cause the transformation of knowledge into desire. Such a middle factor we actually possess in feeling; whenever an idea is accompanied by feeling it is,

in accordance with this feeling, transformed into desire; otherwise, not." (Horwicz, "Psychologische Analysen auf physiologischer Grundlage," I, 153, II, B. S. 2, S. 61.)

Wundt quoted. "*Every valuation is based on feelings.*" (Wundt, System der Philosophie S. 136).

Fichte quoted. "Whatever appears in impulse and in conscious will must have its primary source and its spontaneous origin in *feeling.*" (J. H. Fichte, Psychologie, II, 137.)

Paulsen quoted. "To him who is entirely destitute of will and feeling, who is merely pure intellect, all propositions expressing relations of value would be inconceivable." (Paulsen, Einleitung in die Philosophie, 2 Auflage, S. 237.)

Rümelin quoted. "Our feelings are the very life of the soul-monad itself; they are, therefore, by no means accessory products of ideation and volition; in them rather is found the true source of the ultimate and most subtle decisions concerning the value of the experiences of life." (Rümelin, Reden und Aufsätze, S. 138 f.)

Hartman quoted. "The pleasure or displeasure which is excited in us immediately and involuntarily at the sight of the actions of others is, *in the first*

place, *sensation* (feeling). Only in referring the sensation to the object that causes it does the pleasure or displeasure become approbation or disapprobation of the object; i.e. from the sensation (feeling) springs a judgment about the object. The judgment states whether the object excites in us a pleasing or a displeasing sensation (feeling), and consists in a valuation of the object according to the reaction of *feeling* excited in us by it." "The sensation (feeling) takes precedence while the judgment follows after it merely as its helpful servant." (E. V. Hartman, "Das sittliche Bewusstsein," 2. Auflage, S. 98 ff.)

Is interest more than mere feeling?

Our statement that "all interest is based on feeling" requires a more exact and explicit definition. Is valuation (interest) contained wholly in feeling? Is all valuation the same as feeling?

Prominent psychologists, like Lotze, defend this view of the matter. It must be admitted that in many cases, perhaps in most, feeling and valuation coincide. Especially in the first stages of the unfolding of mental life, where memory and judgment are developed but little, if at all, all value and want of value are con-

ceived directly through feeling, and, accordingly, all impulses to desire and action lie in feeling alone. Very often, even in the fully mature mental life, much oftener indeed than the majority of us are inclined to believe, the decision as to value and want of value is made directly and absolutely by the feeling. The sensuous interest with which a person with a good appetite enjoys palatable food or drink; the æsthetic (intellectual, sympathetic) interest with which a susceptible mind listens to an interesting speech, follows a witty conversation, enjoys the beauty of nature, delights in a charming picture, or some other work of art; the religious interest with which the pious mind takes part in an edifying divine service, etc.—all these and many other manifestations of interest are wholly contained in the corresponding sensuous or mental feelings; in all these cases interest is nothing more than feeling.*

Memory of value.

Such, however, is not in every instance the

* After the exposition previously made of this particular point, it will hardly be necessary to show that in these and in similar cases the "attention" paid to the thing is to be conceived not as included in the nature of interest itself, but rather as a result of it.

case. In the same manner that the objective impressions of perception as, for example, large and small, black and white, loud and soft, etc. —when frequently repeated, can be reproduced through *imagination* without receiving anew the respective impressions through the senses, so by the various affections of our *feelings* there are left more or less distinct traces in our minds, which enable us to *recollect* that which has been felt without the recurrence of the feelings themselves. Suppose, for instance, we should hear of a coming musical performance. The interest in music is roused in us, possibly with the result that we decide to be present at the performance. Such an interest is evidently not identical with those *æsthetic* (musical) feelings that are aroused by actually hearing music. In this case we are dealing rather with a consciousness of value which merely *remembers* former musical enjoyments and now expects *something similar*. This consciousness of value through remembrance has necessarily some connection with the corresponding original feelings, but is not identical with those feelings. This kind of valuation might be called "*memory of value.*" Nothing

Distinct traces left by feelings.

is opposed to the supposition that in such cases the feelings in question actually, even though but faintly, rise again in our mind and are, therefore, not mere memory ideas. This objection is, indeed, difficult to answer, since here the decision depends entirely on introspection, which differs with individuals, and in these subtle emotions of our mental life, cannot be relied on. That in many cases the feelings are thus actually revived will not be denied; but that such is always the case we should, on the ground of experience, be inclined to dispute. The reason why some think that interest ought under all circumstances to be identified with feeling lies, if we mistake not, in the apprehension that, by admitting the contrary, they cause *motivity*, which they consider the exclusive property of feeling, to be carried over into the field of *intellect*. This fear, however, is groundless; for that consciousness of value which consists in the recollection of former affective experiences, even though it is not itself a feeling, yet has its *roots* entirely in feeling, grows out of feeling, and derives its motivity from feeling, through which alone all value and want of value is at first conceived,

The "causa movens" of desire and volition.

and which, therefore, remains the sole *causa movens* of all desire and volition.*

Quotation inserted by the *Editor:*

* "The single feelings in an emotion that closes with a volitional act are usually far from being of equal importance. Certain ones among them, together with their related ideas, are prominent as those which are *most important* in preparing for the act. Those combinations of ideas and feelings which in our subjective apprehension of the volition are the immediate antecedents of the act are called *motives* of volition. Every motive may be divided into an ideational and an affective component. The first we may call the *moving reason*, the second the *impelling force* of action. . . . When the emotions are of composite character, the reasons and impelling forces are generally mixed, often to so great an extent that it would be difficult for the author of the act himself to decide which was the leading motive. This is due to the fact that the impelling forces of a volitional act combine, just as the elements of a composite feeling do, to form a unitary whole in which all other impulses are subordinated under a single predominating one; the feelings of like direction strengthening and accelerating the effect, those of opposite direction weakening it. In the combinations of ideas and feelings which we call motives, the deciding importance in preparing for the act of will belongs to the feelings, that is, to the impelling forces, rather than to the ideas. This follows from the very fact that feelings are integral components of the volitional process itself, while the ideas are of influence only indirectly, through their connections with the feelings. The assumption of a volition arising from pure intellectual considerations, of a decision opposed to the inclinations expressed in the feelings, is a psychological contradiction in itself. It rests upon the abstract concept of a transcendental will absolutely distinct from actual psychical volitions." (*Outlines of Psychology*, by Wilhelm Wundt. Translated by Charles H. Judd. Page 185.)

Judgment of value.

The development of man's consciousness of value reaches its culmination in a "judgment of value." In the same manner that our apprehension of the outside world proceeds from sense-impressions to ideas, and from these to knowledge proper in concepts and judgments, so the subjective affective impressions of value clarify by degrees into proper "*knowledge of value*," into definite "*judgments of value*" in which the mind, summing up and condensing the various kinds of single impressions of value, brings them into fixed forms and standards. It is evident that in single affective experiences the actual value of the thing causing them cannot always manifest itself completely and without ambiguity. The same thing that for the moment affords us high gratification and vivid joy may, afterwards, in its consequences or when it affects us from a different side, prove very injurious. Besides, there is much in the valuation of feeling that is subjective and varies greatly according to age, degree of culture, surroundings, etc.

How correct valuation is attained.

We therefore arrive at a correct valuation of the various experiences and possessions of life only through long acquaintance with active

life, and through an *education* such as will make it possible for the mind to be affected from the most diverse sides, to draw the proper inference from the various single impressions of feeling or from the single recollections of value, and to deposit this inference, as stated above, in the form of definite judgments of value, in which the individual and one-sided parts of the single impressions of feeling clarify into greater precision, purity, and objectiveness.

Judgments of value culminating in maxims of action.

If interest were entirely contained in feeling, and if, accordingly, our efforts and volitions depended entirely on momentary excitations of feeling, our actions could never rise to that consistency which we not only postulate as the most essential element of character, but actually observe in many instances of human activity, since these excitations — in spite of their force and warmth—are unsteady and vacillating. This consistency of character is made possible only when out of the fluctuation of feelings valuation ripens into constant judgments of value, which latter again lead, with psychological necessity, to fixed "maxims" of action.

Children, savages, and so-called "sentimentalists," in whom feeling abnormally predominates, never reach such consistency of character, for the very reason that in all their desires and decisions, they depend too much on the momentary force of feeling.

Unselfish actions inspired by deep emotions.

These statements are not meant to retract the concession already made, that even in fully matured mental life valuation quite often manifests itself as real feeling, and, as such, influences the will. In many cases, especially when in a struggle with adverse forces strong impulses to vigorous resolutions are needed, the immediate interference of feeling evinces itself as a moral necessity, whether it be a deep stirring of sympathy or a strong inspiration of patriotism, or some other powerful emotion, that is required to give the stimulus for great and unselfish actions. If in the foregoing it is conceded that judgments of value (and memory of value) are inferior to the feelings, in warmth and power of motivity, nevertheless the determining influence which these judgments of value exercise on our wills is, as experience shows, very potent. But, of course—and this should be emphasized once

Influence of judgments of value.

more in conclusion—these judgments of value exercise this influence only because, and in so far as, they really have grown out of the living soil of one's own feelings. It is possible that a man may express a judgment with rhetorical and logical correctness concerning the value of æsthetic, ethic, religious, and other subjects without being himself convinced of their value; in other words, without having actually experienced the value of these things in his feelings. For instance, he might either, in good faith, repeat what he had heard from others about those subjects, or he might, from selfish motives, feign an interest in them. This, however, is a manner of judging things which cannot be recognized as true "judgment of value" in the only sense of that expression here admitted, and which, since it lacks the force and truth of personal experience and conviction, cannot in itself furnish any motive influence to the will. We advisedly say "in itself," in order to intimate that wherever such judging does seem to furnish motives, the motives actually spring from *secondary interests* not belonging to the thing itself.

Final definition of interest.

The result of the previous discussion may be summed up in the following statements: *All interest* (*all valuation*) *depends on feeling; and that in the twofold sense either that it is itself feeling or that it developed from feeling by means of other psychical processes. This latter kind of interest also appears in a double form*, namely (*a*), as "value-memory" that is the mere imaginative reproduction (re-expectation) of things formerly felt, and (*b*), as true "value-judgment," which is created by means of the thinking powers, on a basis of feelings of value and recollections of value. Our value-memory and value-judgment possess motive power over our will only for the reason that they spring from feeling, which, as the true organ of valuation, is, ultimately, the *causa movens* of all striving and volition. The memory of value, and especially the judgment of value, exceed in objectiveness and constancy any mere impressions of value resulting from a state of feeling; felt impressions of value, on the other hand, have advantage over memory of value and judgment of value by their *greater warmth and motive power*.

The division of interest into feeling of value,

Classification of interests.

memory of value, and judgment of value grew directly out of the very nature of interest. If we take into consideration the *objects* to which we attach interest, further distinctions will become apparent. According as valuation is directed upon sensuous or ideational objects, we may distinguish between *sensuous*, that is lower, and *ideal*, that is higher, interests. This distinction is, at least theoretically, justifiable, even though in reality one kind often shades into the other, or combines with it. The ideal interests, according to the difference of the corresponding objects of valuation, may again be classified as *intellectual*, *æsthetic*, *sympathetic*, *ethical* and *religious* interests, and interests of *honor*, *patriotism*, etc. Regarding the significance of the most important of these and their connection with the corresponding feelings, enough has already been said. An exhaustive discussion of each kind in turn would, in this place, be superfluous.

Direct and indirect interest.

Following Herbart, interest is usually further divided into direct and indirect interest. We take direct interest in an object, if we esteem it for its own sake; we take indirect interest, if

such interest depends on secondary ends that have nothing to do with the intrinsic value of the object. Interest in science, for instance, is direct, if that which interests us is investigation and knowledge itself; the interest is indirect, if science is esteemed only as a means for selfish aims, such as honor or gain.

"To one, science is the high, the heavenly goddess; to another, an excellent cow providing him with butter." (Schiller.)

Illustration of direct and indirect interest.

He who loves and practices the good for its own sake thereby manifests direct interest in it; on the other hand, he who ostensibly practices the good in order to receive reward or to avoid punishment, manifests only indirect interest. It cannot be denied that the one kind of interest often goes hand in hand with the other kind; nevertheless, the distinction is not only logically justifiable, but it is also of great importance in its ethical, and especially in its pedagogical, bearings.

Finally, as already explained, interest is to be distinguished as positive or negative, according as a thing attracts us by its value or repels us by its worthlessness.

II.

SIGNIFICANCE OF INTEREST IN THE IDEATING AND REASONING ACTIVITY OF THE MIND.

The ideating process.

Our mental life consists in a constant stream in which ideas are incessantly coming and going. Not only are new impressions continually introduced into our consciousness through the action upon our senses of external objects, but the ideas previously obtained return, raised through a variety of causes out of the darkness of unconsciousness into renewed consciousness. They come, one bringing up another, in the most varied combinations, soon to glide again, one by one, out of consciousness, because the limitations of our consciousness do not permit the simultaneous reception of a great number of impressions.

To enter into particulars as to this change of

ideas, its causes, and its laws, would not be in place here; it is our purpose to select only that which has some direct bearing on the theme of this work.

The mind's attitude to rising ideas.

In the first place we must call attention to the well-known phenomenon, that our mind meets with a different measure of attention, the various impressions introduced into consciousness by the change of ideas. When several impressions enter into consciousness simultaneously, or when impressions replace one another successively, be they presentations or representations, the mind does not, as a rule, treat all alike, but grasps now one impression and then another with greater vigor, conceiving it more distinctly and retaining it longer in consciousness than the others. Hence we speak of changing degrees of attention. The customary distinction between voluntary and involuntary attention is justifiable, but not without some limitations. If we take "will" in the broadest sense that the term admits of, so that we include not only resolution proper, but also every "effort" and "desire," then *all* attention has to be regarded as a matter of will; for a certain "effort" of the mind, an

Two kinds of attention.

effort to receive the respective impressions or to retain them, undoubtedly accompanies attention under all circumstances. If, on the other hand, the term "will" is limited to those cases where, with conscious deliberation, a *choice* of the object of attention is made among several possibilities, the distinction between voluntary and involuntary attention is valid. Accordingly we speak of "*voluntary*" attention in all those cases where attention is directed upon a particular object of consciousness only after the will has made a choice among several objects competing for the first place in attention and has rejected the others in favor of this one. When, however, our attention turns to an object without any struggle and without any selective activity of the will, the attraction to it being so strong that other objects of perception cannot compete with it, then we call such attention "involuntary." For instance, if while hearing a tedious lecture we resist the temptation to think of other things more interesting to us, and —with a certain effort of will—force ourselves to follow the thoughts of the speaker, we have an example of voluntary attention. When, on

Involuntary attention.

the other hand, captivated by an interesting speech, we pay attention without such inner effort and conflict, we have an instance of involuntary attention.

Voluntary attention.

If we now take up voluntary attention, the question arises: How can it be explained? In what does that force of attraction consist which favors one object of our consciousness above another, enabling it to engage the mind in such a manner that the mind will involuntarily turn to this particular object and center consciousness upon it? At first sight we are very apt to ascribe to our impressions a varying strength, by means of which one impression makes itself felt in consciousness with greater intensity than another. To some extent this explanation is indeed justifiable. Sense impressions, as those of sight, hearing, pain, etc., possess indeed greatly varying degrees of intensity, and the degree of intensity in many cases undoubtedly governs the amount of attention. This is the case when we hear a loud explosion or receive a dazzling impression of light, etc. In many instances, however, this does not hold true, though it may appear to be so. Thus unusually strong impres-

sions simply because of their rarity, have, as a rule, a peculiar charm, a peculiar interest for us; for in general, everything unusual and new is accustomed to excite our interest. This interest is either purely intellectual, in that the mind, desirous, as it is, of knowing, and rejoicing at every newly gained knowledge, endeavors to inquire into the nature and causes of the new and unknown; or, this interest is of a more material nature, in that the consideration of the *significance* of the phenomenon in question, of its value or worthlessness, awakens in us corresponding feelings and expectations. We have an instance of material interest when a loud report arouses in us the thought of an accident, and in connection with the thought feelings of fear and anxiety. We have an instance of intellectual interest when the question of the causes and circumstances of the singular phenomenon is uppermost in consciousness. Thus in most cases where apparently the mere intensity of the impression attracts attention, a closer self-observation will establish the fact that an *interest* of some sort is the real ground of attention, or that the attention was aroused only for the moment

Intellectual and material interests.

Interest and attention.

by the violent shock and that its further duration is dependent on related interests. We must also remember that strong sense-impressions, as soon as they have lost, through frequent repetition, the charm of novelty and their further connection with our interests are, as a rule, no longer able to hold our attention. On the other hand, even the weakest sense-impression, if only it affects our interests—a slight noise, for instance, that creates in us the idea of imminent danger—may occupy our liveliest attention. That in most cases attention, as far as it attaches itself to sense-impressions, is entirely independent of their intensity and is merely based on interest, could further be proven by a variety of instances.

Repeated sense impressions and attention.

If the child directs his attention to the confectionery in a show-window, or the travelling lover of nature to a beautiful landscape, or the lover of music to the melody of a song, etc.; if our attention is attracted by a dying animal which living we have passed indifferently a hundred times; if we are captivated by the sight of a dear acquaintance whom, after a long separation, we see again for the first time, or by the pitiful cries of a loved child: in all these and in a thousand

similar cases the intensity of the respective sensuous perception possesses no import whatever for attention, but the attention is entirely dependent on the *interest* excited in us by those perceptions either immediately or by means of certain thoughts and ideas which they awaken. Whether this interest manifests itself as actual, present feeling, as happens in the case of the child whose cry of distress arouses our sympathy, or whether only previous feelings are recalled or anticipated, as happens in the case where the child's interest attaches itself to the confectionery in the show-window, or whether again consciousness of value appears as actual acknowledgment of value in the form of a judgment—these and other distinctions we may, after the above discussions, leave to the reader himself.

Intensity of impression of less value as a factor of attention than interest.

It follows from the foregoing that in the sphere of sensation and perception, the intensity of the impressions determines involuntary attention in a far less degree than does the interest connected with those impressions. Much more, where the purely psychical events of *ideation* and *reasoning* are considered, the intensity of impression, when compared with interest as a

cause of attention, proves to be wholly inferior to it. We cannot hold that the intensity of the ideating and reasoning activity as such is subject to variations, since the external stimuli which cause the sensations to vary in strength are not repeated with the reproduction of former sensations. "Recollection in reproducing faithfully the contents of former sensations as to quality and strength does not, at the same time, reproduce the excitation which we experienced through them. Wherever it *seems* to do so, it in reality rather adds to the reproduced ideas of the former contents the mere image of the former excitation in the form of another idea. The rolling of thunder, however clearly its peculiarity and intensity may be recalled, excites, nevertheless, no stronger emotion upon recurring to the memory than does the recollection of an equally distinct idea of the softest tone. Perhaps at the same time we may think of the greater shocks caused by the more violent sound, but even this idea of the livelier excitation does not now, when recalled, become a stronger emotion in us than the equally distinct conception of the less vigorous affection." (Lotze.)

Lotze quoted.

If, then, the opinion of a varying intensity of ideas (recollected ideas) and of an influence exercised by intensity on attention has to be relinquished, it will be permissible here to regard interest as the *exclusive* cause of attention. Experience confirms this view in every respect. When, for instance, in resting from some fatiguing mental work, we give ourselves up to the play of our ideas, and these, being free from the constraint of will, pass through our consciousness in motley array, first one idea and then another will involuntarily captivate our attention and be more vividly conceived and longer retained than the rest. And in every case—though often not discoverable except by close self-observation—it is a more or less lively *interest*, on account of which one object of thought attracts our attention rather than another. Now it is some accident appealing to our sympathy, then some person in whose welfare we take a lively interest; now it is a place with which tender associations are connected, then the idea of something unpleasant which may await us; or, again, the tormenting thought of some error committed by us. In short, it is always something that interests us,

Interest the cause of attention.

something that arouses in us a feeling of joy, of sympathy, of fear, of hope, etc., or makes itself perceptible in our consciousness of value, either as a recollection and anticipation of former sensations or as actual acknowledgment of value (judgment of value). When our interest is uncommonly lively, when, for instance, the thought of some great misfortune that befell us is the matter in question, then it may be that this thought for hours, days, and even weeks, captivates, as it were, our attention, and though occasionally eclipsed by other ideas, forces itself again and again to the foreground of consciousness, even when we are taking great pains to be rid of it,* so great is the power which interest exercises over the train of our thoughts.

Forced attention.

* The statement that unpleasant, sad, and painful things often also captivate attention seems to be inconsistent with the other fact that unpleasant things repel, or create aversion and opposition. We, indeed, often observe that our mind simply shuts out thoughts causing displeasure. In many cases, however, such thoughts are too strongly interwoven with the whole domain of our interest, and the feelings accompanying them are too predominating for our mind to get completely rid of them. It may also be the case that our mind concentrates its thoughts upon unpleasant things for no other reason than that it tries to find means and ways to allay or evade them.

On the other hand, a great effort of volition is often required to concentrate attention upon utterly uninteresting, indifferent things. To the child, in his very limited sphere of ideas, many things are utterly devoid of interest, though in themselves they are worth knowing, and are regarded important and valuable by a man of education, because of his superior mental standpoint and because of their association with his broader view of the world. Consequently, during instruction the teacher will observe quite frequently that subjects which are of interest to himself are tedious to the pupil, and that the pupil then ceases to follow instruction easily and gladly, but has to *force* his attention. This often requires so great an amount of self-discipline, so great an exercise of volition, that wandering of attention from the subject can be prevented only by resort to vigorous disciplinary measures from without. Yet in many cases a subject which of itself does not interest the mind may be made interesting by the manner in which it is treated.

Conditions favorable to attention.

A problem in arithmetic may treat of things for which the pupil cares nothing, and yet he

will solve it with interest and involuntary attention, provided that the conditions for a clear understanding and successful solution are present. Here interest rests upon that intellectual feeling of pleasure which is awakened by all successful mental effort, by every new increment of knowledge, by every solution of a problem, etc. This kind of interest attended by involuntary attention does not, of course, exist when at the outset, owing to a deficient understanding of the problem, every possibility of a correct solution is excluded.

The Herbartian psychology and attention.

Involuntary attention may likewise be traced back to interest in all those cases where it would seem to be accounted for by some other cause. The Herbartian psychology, for instance, is inclined to find the cause of attention in "*apperception*," by which, in this case, is meant that ideas newly entering consciousness associate with former ideas of a similar nature, and by their help are properly conceived. Attention undoubtedly has some connection with this process, but not in the sense that attention immediately results from apperception as its consequence. Rather is it that from apperception there first

arises *interest*, and then from this interest, as in all other cases, there follows involuntary attention. It is mainly on apperception that a correct knowledge of the new depends; to this knowledge, however, as has been repeatedly pointed out, there is attached a feeling of mental exaltation, an intellectual feeling of pleasure, in which, in this case, interest consists. Thus apperception is only a necessary condition to attention, not its immediate cause. The same may be said of all the other preliminary conditions of successful mental work, which instruction in particular has to take into consideration. Such conditions are clearness and comprehensibility of language, deduction from concrete observation and example, self-effort, wherever possible in the acquirement of knowledge, etc. All these are of great importance to involuntary attention, not, however, immediately, but only because, and in as far as, they awaken that intellectual interest which is always connected with the consciousness of mental progress and acquisition.

Interest sustained by change of subject.

In the same sense also the other statement, that attention depends on an appropriate *change*

of occupation, has to be supplemented. The mind has a natural aversion to holding itself attentively to the same subject for a great length of time. This may be explained by saying that the mind, satiated, as it were, by an exhaustive contemplation of the subject, *loses interest in it*, or that feelings of displeasure due to fatigue set in, which render a continuation of just that kind of mental exercise a torture, and thus produce aversion to it (negative interest).

Voluntary attention differs from involuntary attention, which hitherto has been the subject in question, in being compulsorily directed by volition. Whenever this is the case, the subjects under treatment are always such as are of no *immediate interest* to the mind, and are, therefore, in and of themselves incapable of captivating the attention. That the will, nevertheless, forces attention upon such subjects may indeed, like every volitional decision, find its ultimate explanation in some sort of interest. In these cases, however, the interest is not attached to the objects of attention themselves, but springs from secondary ends and considerations (mediate interest). Such, for instance, is the case when

Mediate interest.

the pupil, during instruction in a subject that is tedious to him, nevertheless forces himself to give attention, because he is afraid of the unpleasant consequences that might ensue from his being inattentive. On the consideration of these consequences (punishment, disgrace, etc.) depends here that mediate interest which causes the mind to occupy itself with matters that possess no intrinsic interest for it. The same thing takes place when, simply for the purpose of earning honor by his knowledge, one, with forced attention, has himself carefully instructed about some work of art of which he understands nothing, and which, therefore, is of no immediate interest to him; or when, again, some piece of scientific work void of interest is executed merely for the sake of gain; and in many similar cases.

Interest a factor in the association of ideas.

Furthermore, interest is of great importance to the ideating and reasoning activity of the mind, because it establishes *lasting relationships among ideas* (*associations*), or, at least, favors their formation.

The main condition of every association of ideas lies undoubtedly in the unity of the

mind.* If this were lacking our thoughts would be "scattered members without a uniting bond, and therefore incapable of entering into any associations with one another." (Wundt.) This mere capability or possibility of forming associations is, however, not sufficient; the mind for its execution requires, in addition, an appropriate *impulse* or *motive*. Such a motive actually exists, and, like every other mental impulse, consists in *interest*. It seems self-evident that our mind, as a homogeneous entity, feels *displeasure* at all disconnected, disorderly juxtaposition of ideas entering consciousness, simply because such a state is opposed to its homogeneous nature; but that, on the other hand, it feels *pleasure* in connecting, arranging, and binding together detached things, because such union is in accordance with its very nature. Now in such pleasure and displeasure lies the *interest* sought, which must be regarded as the true *causa movens* of all association. Naturally, in order to establish this or that particular association, the mind requires

Nature of the mind to establish unity among its states.

* Whether this unity is to be taken as a *substantial* or a functional one makes no material difference in the question under discussion; a closer examination of the matter would, therefore, be out of place here.

this or that particular occasion. In order to unite the numerous details of a landscape into one complete picture, the details must present themselves to our consciousness in a continuous succession in space or time; in order to associate the idea of an historical event and that of the corresponding date, the two must enter consciousness at the *same time;* in order to establish a logical association of ideas, the mind must become conscious of the logical relations existing between these ideas. All these conditions, however, cannot induce the mind to the actual formation of the respective associations, except under the condition that it takes an *interest* in them, and consequently feels the need of uniting the various elements in consciousness.

The mind must feel the need of uniting various elements in consciousness.

But it is not only thus in a general way that the mind takes an interest in establishing unity among its states. It takes, moreover, a special interest in particular kinds of association of ideas for the formation of which this interest is, to be sure, a special inducement. Here we must consider, above all, those associations of ideas that are of an *æsthetic* and *logical* character.

A man of æsthetic sentiments, in passing dif-

Æsthetic interest, intensifying ideas already associated.

ferent landscapes along his path, will, other things being equal, perceive most completely, and retain in his memory most faithfully, that scene which pre-eminently excels the others in beauty and magnificence. The reason for it undoubtedly lies in *æsthetic interest*, and this not only in the sense already discussed, that such interest intensifies attention, but also in this further respect that the æsthetic feeling of value arouses a tendency to trace the *æsthetic relations* existing between the single parts of the whole, and, from an æsthetic standpoint, to unite the separate elements, and to enjoy them æsthetically when so unified. It is evident that such an æsthetic contemplation of the landscape tends to strengthen and intensify association; for although, naturally, the mere connection in space and its perception through the senses warrants a firm connection of the separate parts of the whole, yet there lies in the perception of the æsthetic relations, which by no means are identical with the relations of space, a new associative bond.

Æsthetic interest, forming new associations of ideas.

While in this and in similar cases the æsthetic interest contributes for the most part only to the

strengthening of associations already occasioned in some other manner, in other instances it leads to entirely new associations of ideas. We must here call attention especially to the formative faculty of an *artist's imagination*. It matters not whether the imagination work in sounds, colors, fantasies, or pure thought, its compositions are always of an associative character, as in each case a multiplicity of separate elements are combined in accordance with the laws of æsthetics and united into a whole. That, then, which qualifies the mind of the artist for the formation of those æsthetic associations and stimulates it to form them, is—very essentially, though not exclusively—the æsthetic *feeling of value*, the æsthetic interest. We must assume that in the true artist this æsthetic interest is naturally more highly developed and consequently of an inherently higher constructive power than in the average man.

Association of ideas, caused by intellectual interest.

The case stands similar with *intellectual interest*. The pleasure resulting from knowledge, together with the consequent desire for more knowledge, not only directs the attention of the mind upon the objects to be known and imparts

to the mind an impulse to penetrate an intricate matter *by the aid of analysis*, but such interest proves, further, to be the actuating cause of the most manifold logical *associations of ideas* in which ideas, formerly standing isolated in consciousness, are lastingly linked together as cause and effect, antecedent and consequent, means and end, as equal, contrary, contrasted, etc. From early childhood this intellectual interest makes itself felt as a strong motive in awaking and connecting thoughts, manifesting itself, above all, in the numberless questions of small children: How did it happen? Why is it so? What is it for? Who made it? etc. Even though many of these questions must remain unanswered for the time being, or cannot be answered at all, because the child in his desire for knowledge often asks explanation where explanation is impossible, yet in many cases the child actually arrives at the knowledge sought, for the reason that the nature of this knowledge, in most cases, is such that things previously standing isolated, or having only a purely mechanical connection, are now recognized in their logical relation, and become, on the basis of this relation, permanently con-

Intellectual interest a strong motive in childhood in connecting ideas.

nected in consciousness. It lies in the nature of the matter that, as the development of the mind progresses, the pleasure in inquiry and knowledge continually increases. This growing interest necessarily acts as a growing impulse to produce increasingly richer and more varied associations of ideas.

Interest, an aid to memory.

Interest proving to be the condition of attention, as well as of various associations of ideas, becomes, thereby, of great importance to *memory*. That we remember most firmly what most interests us is a well-known fact. One reason for this may be found in the close relation in which interest, as shown above, stands to *attention*. The more a thing interests us, the more attentively do we consider it; and the more attentively we consider it, the more firmly is it retained in our memory. That which passes lightly through consciousness leaves no distinct and lasting traces on the mind; those ideas and perceptions, on the other hand, to which our mind offers a lively attention, which it consequently examines closely and retains for some time in consciousness, produce upon the mind strong and lasting impressions, and thereby

fulfill the conditions for their exact recollection.*

How interest aids memory.

Interest, moreover, materially aids memory by establishing innumerable *associations of ideas* in which the associated elements hold and support one another, or, more correctly, in which the mind itself, on the basis of this self-established coherence, preserves the single elements in their connection, and reproduces them far more faithfully than would be the case if the separate elements stood isolated in consciousness. Finally, we must remember that the mind returns more readily to what is interesting than to that in which it takes no interest; that it occupies itself oftener with the former, and thinks more frequently of it; and that this repeated reproduction of the ideas in question contributes much towards fixing them in memory.

After the previous discussion no further proof

* Whether these unconscious residues of conscious ideas are of an immaterial or of a material nature (changes in the nerve substance), or are both at the same time, is a question which need not be discussed here. It is answered variously, and makes no real difference with the fact in question: the psychical result is the same in all possible cases.

is needed to show that interest, by intensifying attention, and promoting association of ideas, and aiding memory, is likewise of importance to *intelligence* and its development, and that in this respect intellectual interest especially plays a prominent part.

III.

SIGNIFICANCE OF INTEREST WITH REGARD TO DESIRE AND VOLITION (ACTIVITY).

Interest the source of all motives.

All desire and volition result from psychical causes. By this fact, established in experience, liberty of choice is not altogether set aside, but arbitrary will, in the sense of utterly unconditional determination free from motive, is excluded. The term *motive* may be taken in a broader or narrower sense. In its broader sense it must be conceived as the totality of conditions on which the origin of some volitional act (desire) depends. In this sense also the purely intellectual processes of perception, ideation, and reasoning come under the concept, motive; for all volition evidently presupposes as a condition of its realization some *knowledge* of the existence and the quality of the object of will.

In its narrower sense the term is to be taken as the etymological meaning of the word "motive" indicates, namely, as the impelling *cause* of volition. In this sense—and this is the sense in which the term is to be taken here—all motives rest upon *interest.* That which is of no interest, an indifferent matter, exercises no determining influence whatever upon the will, either in a positive or in a negative direction. This is not only a generally acknowledged fact of experience, which requires no further proof, but it follows at the same time quite logically from the concept of an indifferent thing, whose nature is such that it neither attracts nor repels, that it, accordingly, does not affect volition. In all instances, only that acts as a motive which is not indifferent to us, which accordingly in some way *interests* us, which is, in some manner, valued by us. And this valuation is to be understood in the double sense that whatever is valued positively *attracts* our desire, and whatever is valued negatively (whatever causes a feeling of displeasure, disgust, fear, etc.) is accompanied by a striving in the opposite direction, an *aversion.* (See p. 10.)

The indifferent without influence on the will.

Volition actuated at first by feeling alone.

In the first stages of development of mental life, where interest, as previously pointed out, consists wholly in feeling, all desire also is actuated immediately by feelings—mostly sensuous feelings. Even in the further course of development feeling makes itself conspicuous to a great extent as an immediately determining motive. In the progressive development of mind, however, as the consciousness of value becomes more and more a matter of *memory* and *reflection*, feeling does not lastingly maintain its originally exclusive dominion; but those forms of interest which we previously defined as "memory of value" and "judgment of value" come gradually to the aid of the feeling as motive forces. Since, to be sure, these forms of interest, too, grow out of feeling, in terms of which, originally, all value and want of value are interpreted in consciousness, all power of modification may, in this sense, ultimately be traced back to feeling. If a mind were merely intellect, and never from the beginning of its existence had felt any emotion of pleasure or displeasure, it would be void of all interest, and would, accordingly, not find in itself any impulse whatever to desire or will.

Confirmation from modern psychology.

In holding this view of the matter, we find ourselves in agreement with the great majority of the representatives of modern psychology, although we differ from them in the one particular, that most of them hold that interest—which according to our view displays itself in the three forms, feeling of value, memory of value, and judgment of value—consists entirely in feeling, and that, accordingly, all motivity of will springs immediately from feeling.

We present a few quotations: "If we inquire into the forces that set activity into motion, we cannot deny that the effort to retain and to regain *pleasure* and the effort to avoid *pain* are the only motives of all practical activity." (*Lotze*, Mikrok. II., 3. Aufl. S. 312.) "Whatever appears in impulse and in conscious will must have its first source and its involuntary origin in feeling." (*J. H. Fichte*, Psychologie, II., 137.) "A mediating factor is required which causes the transformation of knowledge into desire. Such a middle member we actually possess in *feeling;* whenever knowledge is accompanied by feeling, it is transformed into desires to correspond with this feeling; other-

Lotze quoted.

Fichte quoted.

wise not." "There is no desire but has its basis in feeling." (*Horwicz*, Psycholog. Analysen auf Physiol. Grundlage, I., S. 153; II., B. S. 61.)

Horwicz quoted.

The representatives of "voluntarism," i.e., of that doctrine which regards *will* as the primary element and the truly essential one of the mind, though naturally obliged to explain the first (unconscious) beginnings of volition in a different manner, nevertheless trace, as a rule, "conscious" volition back to feeling as the impelling motive. So does *Wundt* when he says: "All activity springs from feelings that strive for gratification. If these should be wanting, all manifestations of life would cease." (*Wundt*, System d. Philos., S. 641).

Wundt quoted.

"Motives are processes always accompanied by feelings, and these feelings turn out to be those elements of the motive in which the real cause of activity is contained. We would not will a thing if we were not stimulated by feelings." (*Wundt*, Vorlesungen über Menschen und Tierseele, 2. Aufl., S. 239.)* Thus E.

Quotation inserted by the *Editor*:

* "The richer the ideational and affective contents of experience, the greater the variety of the emotions and the

Hartmann quoted.

v. Hartmann: "Herbart falls short of exactness in not sufficiently keeping apart the immediate reaction to sensation (*feeling*) and the judgment resulting therefrom, and touching the object that causes the sensation; and, instead, he treats the judgment as an immediate one. By this lack of distinction he is led to the fatal error of mistaking the *sensation-element* or *feeling-element* of the psychical reaction immediately underlying the judgment, and, conse-

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wider the sphere of volitions. There is no feeling or emotion that does not in some way prepare for a volitional act or at least have some part in such a preparation. All feelings, even those of a relatively indifferent character, contain in some degree an effort towards or away from some end. This effort may be very general and aimed merely at the maintenance or removal of the present affective state. While volitions appear as the most complex form of affective processes, presupposing all others—that is, feelings and emotions—as their components, still, we must not overlook the fact that single feelings continually appear which do not unite to form emotions, and emotions appear which do not end in volitional acts. In the total interconnection of psychical processes, however, these three stages condition one another and form the related parts of a single process, which is complete only when it becomes a volition. In this sense a feeling may be thought of as the beginning of a volition, or a volition may be thought of as a composite affective process, and an emotion may be regarded as an intermediate stage between the two." (*Outlines of Psychology*, by Wilhelm Wundt. Translated by Charles H. Judd. Page 185.)

quently, of considering the judgment as independently existing in the pure ether of ideation, wholly separated from the basis of will. This view leads to entirely wrong conclusions, e.g., to the absolute negation of all power or will-energy in approbation or disapprobation. In reality, however, the pleasure due to liking and the displeasure due to disliking spring from the gratification or non-gratification of some unconscious desire. And in the same manner the æsthetic-ethical approval or disapproval, by virtue of the *sensation-element* or *feeling-element* connected with it, acts again as a *motive* or stimulus to some volition, being undoubtedly, in the former case, a positive desire in regard to the object that causes the sensation, and in the latter case a negative desire." (E. v. Hartmann, "Das sittliche Bewusstsein," 2. Aufl., S. 100.) And *Paulsen* (Einl. i. d. Philosophie, 2. Aufl., S. 116): "There is no impulse to will of which we do not become conscious in feeling, and *no feeling* that is not, at the same time, *an impulse to will.*"

Paulsen quoted.

Objections to Herbart's view.

Herbart and his followers held quite exceptional views on this point, altogether denying

motive influence to feeling and valuation, and tracing back the motive cause of desire solely to *complications of the ideating mechanism.* It is not our intention, in this place, to examine this view more closely and to refute it,* but only to answer briefly a few objections to our view made from that quarter.

They hold that, according to experience, our desire is not always aroused by things that interest us, by things that are of value to us, but also in many cases by indifferent things. In some instances such really *seems* to be the case ; but on a closer examination of such instances it is always found that at the basis of the interest there is some valuation, which has been easily overlooked because of its extreme individual nature. Many a thing that is worthless when looked upon from an objective standpoint, i.e., in the universal judgment, may, nevertheless, under peculiar circumstances, seem valuable to a certain individual disposition or temporary mood, and may, therefore, be desired. To the wilful child impetuously desiring an object to

Desire not aroused by indifferent things.

* We refer here to our treatise, "Die haupts. Irrtümer d. Herb. Psychol.," S. 130 ff.

which, at other times, he is not likely to attach any value, the possession of the object is by no means an indifferent matter, inasmuch as in this state of caprice he wishes to have his will, and feels dissatisfied as long as he cannot have it. Or when the miser desires to play with his gold: such an occupation viewed from an objective standpoint is certainly something very indifferent; to him, however, in his distorted cast of mind, this play affords real pleasure, and for that reason he desires it. Similar arguments may be brought forward in all other cases where apparently something indifferent is desired.

Unpleasant things sometimes desired but not for their own sake.

It must be admitted that sometimes unpleasant things, too, are desired and pleasant things avoided. In all such cases, however, the unpleasant thing is desired and the pleasant thing avoided, not for its own sake, but only for the purpose of thereby obtaining or keeping a greater good, of holding out against or avoiding a greater evil. Such is the case when, for instance, a sick person asks for the bitter medicine, in order to be cured of sickness, or when a virtuous person abstains from some forbidden sensual pleasure in order to keep his conscience pure, etc.

Equally irrelevant is the further objection that many things are actually valued without being desired, and that, consequently, valuation could not be considered as a sufficient motive of desire. This assertion is based on the supposition that an effect, B, traceable to a cause, A, must take place always and under all circumstances whenever A occurs. This supposition, however, is false; it loses sight of the fact that A, even if it be the sufficient cause of B, cannot bring about the latter when counteracted by *obstacles*. A magnet sufficiently strong to attract a piece of iron of certain size and weight held near it cannot, of course, attract when the movement of the piece of iron is arrested by other forces. Shall we, therefore, deny power of attraction to the magnet? Quite similar is the case with psychical powers. If some interest is felt in our consciousness without arousing a related desire or actuating the will, the reason is that certain *obstacles* prevent the rising of such a desire. These obstacles may be stronger interests of a different kind, which give the will a different direction. That a mother feeding her child on some sweet food which she, nevertheless, would

Desire prevented from becoming motive and actuating the will by obstacles.

enjoy herself, does not take it away from the child, nay, does not even allow herself to feel a longing for it, is simply due to her *motherly love*. This love for the child is, in this case, that "obstacle," that more powerful interest which either entirely prevents the rising of desire for the food or else stifles the desire in embryo.

Other conditions that restrain desire.

In other cases the certainty of being unable to attain one's desire may stand in the way, or the consideration of the difficulties that have to be faced, or of the unpleasant consequences that would ensue from giving gratification to the desire, and other similar objections. In order properly to explain the single psychical events, we must avoid detaching them from their connection with mental life as a whole. As in the world of material events, so too in the psychical world, the single event can act and make itself perceptible only to such an extent as its *connection with the whole* will permit. This is a fact which the objection considered in this paragraph overlooks.

But a final opposing argument is as follows: Is it not a generally acknowledged requisition

that man should be governed in his desires, decisions, and actions by his *intellect?* And is not the observation that this is actually done in many cases opposed to the statement that *interest only* has motive influence over the will; interest with whose warmth of feeling "cold intellect" evidently has nothing in common? Our answer, in the first place, will be that interest, though in the beginning identical with feeling, changes by degrees into the form of the *judgment of value* (as pointed out on, p. 26), and that this judgment of value, though growing out of feeling and having motive power only for that reason, yet is no longer original feeling, but already an intellectual function of the mind, which in this judgment sums up and comprises all the single impressions of value upon feeling. In this respect interest and intellectual activity do not absolutely exclude each other. More-

Intellect only a regulating factor of volition.

over, in those innumerable cases where interest actually coincides with feeling, and as such immediately actuates will, the alleged influence of the intellect is in perfect accord—not, however, in the sense that intellectual reflection might as a true *motive* (see, p. 56) *actuate* will, and thus

replace feeling, but in the sense that it exercises a *regulating* influence upon our wishes and decisions.

One of the most essential advantages that distinguishes the mental life of man from that of the beast, and which, at the same time, secures to the former a certain liberty of will-determination, resides in the fact that man is able to *deliberate* before choosing. He does not blindly follow the motive (interest) which happens to predominate in his consciousness at the moment, but—looking backward and forward—allows further interests to make themselves felt, and deliberates on the various possibilities open to his activity. This reflection of intellect is, according to experience, of wide-reaching importance in our desires and decisions; but the assertion is unalterable that what ultimately actuates will are always interests, whether they be real feelings or recollections and judgments of value which have grown out of feeling. Here the case of real feelings only is to be considered. To illustrate the matter by an example: Suppose a servant arouses the indignation of his master. The master is about to dismiss him,

Illustration of how decision is influenced by intellectual reflection.

but thinks the matter over once more. Among other things he thinks of the servant's poor mother who would be reduced to great sorrow and misery by his dismissal. The master's *sympathy* is aroused, and in obedience to this emotion of his kind heart he decides to show favor once more. Here the decision is, no doubt, materially due to his deliberation; it was this that prevented the master from a hasty decision of the opposite kind; it was this that gave rise to the thought of the poor mother, and with the thought the feeling of sympathy; but the *motive* and *power* for this praiseworthy action was, nevertheless, not furnished by reflection, but by the *feeling* of *sympathy*.

Intellectual reflection enables other interests to rise.

All other cases of this kind may be explained in a similar manner. The influence which intellectual reflection exercises upon our tendencies and decisions resides then, generally speaking, not in an ability to urge on the will to a decision, but only in an ability to prevent us from hasty decisions, to point out the various possible actions and their consequences, and to allow also other motives (interests), perhaps more powerful ones, to be felt in addition to that which is ruling consciousness at a given moment. Thus the in-

fluence of the intellect on will is not so much actuating as regulating, and it has fitly been compared to a *finger-post* showing the traveller the right road without bringing him further on his way, or to a *pendulum* regulating the movement of a clock without effecting it.

View from the moral standpoint.

In conclusion we would like briefly to touch upon a few comments which might be made upon our view from an *ethical* standpoint. The question might be stated whether this opinion, in admitting no other kind of motives except the feelings of pleasure and displeasure and the valuations springing from them, does not necessarily include the concession that all human ambition is directed upon *selfish* aims—the gaining or retaining of some *pleasure*, the avoiding of some *displeasure*—a concession which would logically be followed by another one, namely, that there is no true, disinterested morality. We know that practical philosophy has repeatedly given attention to this question. *Kant* was of the opinion that every activity stimulated by feelings was necessarily of a selfish nature, and for this reason he demanded that moral activity —incompatible with such motives—should en-

tirely emancipate itself from feeling, and should follow solely the disinterested *moral law of reason*—the "categorical imperative." Though it may be true that genuine morality excludes selfish motives—a question that cannot be discussed more explicitly in this place—yet we must deny the correctness of the original supposition that all activity prompted by feelings is necessarily of a selfish character. This supposition is based upon the inadmissible confusion of the notions of *motive* and *end*, and is seen to be erroneous as soon as these two concepts are properly distinguished. This will be discussed somewhat more fully in the following section.

Actions from selfish motives.

In many instances, it is true, the feeling that sets activity in motion, whether it is really present or whether it is only ideated, is motive and end at the same time. If we strive to retain some sensuous pleasure that we are enjoying at the moment, or try to regain some previous enjoyment of which we are reminded; if we attempt to escape some pain that at the moment is tormenting us, or whose recurrence we fear—in these and in many similar instances the pleasure or displeasure which we feel, of

only imagine, is, at the same time, motive and end of our striving (resistance). Not only is this the case with sensuous things, but also, to a great extent, with the higher, ideal experiences of life. The pleasure derived from inquiry and knowledge, the enjoyment of the beautiful in nature as well as in art; the happiness of knowing ourselves esteemed by others, and the woful consciousness of the reverse; the happy feeling due to a pure, and the vexation due to an impure, conscience—all these and many similar states of feeling make themselves quite frequently perceptible as motives of our desire, in the sense that the actuating pleasure or displeasure is, at the same time, the object we desire to obtain or try to escape. In such cases we desire our own pleasure or strive against our own displeasure; volition, therefore, remains within the boundaries of egoism.

Unselfish actions.

Such, however, is not always the case. Innumerable deeds of charity, prompted by pure, unselfish benevolence, have been done, and are still being done, in order to assist or save our neighbors. It is true the materialistic ethics of the present time assures us that

at a close examination the motive of such actions would turn out to be, in every instance, some self-interest, though hidden and subtle it may be. Frequently, indeed, such egoism lies at the base, whether it be a coarser, grosser egoism greedy of reward and honor, or a finer egoism desirous of doing away with the grieving sight of another's distress, or of procuring the happy feeling of self-complacency.

But besides the possibility and reality of this manner of acting there also, without doubt, exists the possibility and reality of instances where the welfare of our neighbors is desired and actually promoted without any selfish by-ends whatsoever—be it from pure love, or from the pure sense of duty of a strong conscience, or from other unselfish motives. What the poets celebrate in the song of "The Brave Man," * or in

Instances of self-sacrificing action.

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* A poem by Gottfried August Burger, the story of which is :

A flood was threatening to sweep away a bridge on which a tollman, his wife and child, lived. A count offered a purse of gold for their rescue, and a wanderer braved the storm and saved the perishing family. He refused the reward, preferring to have it given to the tollman. *Ed.*

the "Pledge,"* and in similar poems, is, indeed, not an idle fancy. History and daily life offer many instances of self-sacrificing charity performed at the risk of one's own life, where, in view of the greatness of the sacrifice, all selfish motives would fail. It may well have happened that a person has sacrificed his life for others because he was tired of it, or because from the omission of the deed he would have had to fear consequences that he deemed still worse than a quick death—i.e., from selfish motives; but in thousands of instances the case has stood differently: a happy, hopeful life has been sacrificed when, if spared, no consequences could have arisen in any way equivalent to the greatness of the sacrifice. In such cases to claim selfish motives is to mock at the law of causality; for, as already stated, the greatness of the deed and of the sacrifice stands no longer in any

* A poem by Friedrich von Schiller:

A young man is to be crucified for a political crime. His brother offers himself as a pledge, that he may see his family once more. The condemned one, belated by unforeseen circumstances, makes every effort to return before it is too late. With the utmost exertion of his powers he succeeds in returning at the last moment, and is pardoned for his noble conduct. *Ed.*

relation to the motive power of any selfish aims that might come under consideration. It is only from the unrestrainable force of a great and noble feeling — of pity, patriotic inspiration, etc.—that such deeds of self-sacrifice can be satisfactorily explained.

Action from purely ethical motives.

In the above instances, although activity, while free from self-interest, still contains some eudæmonistic trait, inasmuch as it aims at the *welfare of others*, yet instances of ethical activity are not lacking which have nothing whatever to do with considerations of happiness to be gained, or with the obtaining of any "*advantage*" whatsoever. Suppose a man of highly developed veracity is tempted to tell a lie which he positively knows would never come to light, and would harm neither himself nor others, but that he, nevertheless, overcomes the temptation and adheres to the truth; such an action *may* be explained, it is true, from the egoistic motive that he wished to escape the harassing feeling of remorse (conscience), or that he wished to retain the happy feeling of self-complacency; but psychology admits of this other not less justifiable explanation that, aside from these or similar

advantages, the simple love of truth or the horror of a lie, as such, determined the will.

Illustration from the life of Socrates.

When Socrates, in obedience to the laws, rejecting every sufficiently feasible and easily excusable attempt at saving his life, drank the poisoned cup, it may, again, from a psychological standpoint, be admissible to trace back this manner of acting to the fear that otherwise the good cause, to the service of which he had devoted his life, might suffer harm, or to the selfish motive that he did not wish to forfeit the glory of virtue or his salvation in the next world. Not less justifiable, however, is the other explanation that, utterly disregarding all consequences and advantages of his action, he merely followed the *impulse of his strongly developed sense of right and duty*, the voice of that "dæmon" (divine influence), as he called it, which in other things too was decisive of his actions.

Many other cases of a similar kind may be dealt with in the same manner. He who disputes the impossibility of actions of this kind is simply still adhering to the antiquated mistake that the motive and the aim of activity coincide in all instances, and that, above all, feeling possesses

motive force only in so far as the object of feeling is desired in the form of some advantage, enjoyment, etc., that has been anticipated, either in our own favor or in favor of others. A careful observation of mental life shows that such is by no means always the case. The feelings, in consequence of their *warmth of emotion* that raises the soul above the state of cold indifference, and especially the ideal feelings with which we are concerned here, have in themselves an *expansive, motive force*, which is able to actuate will in a certain direction; and it is not necessary that the thought of some advantage, beckoning from afar, as it were, should lend its aid as a supplementary motor force.

Ideal feelings may actuate the will.

In a person who is deeply impressed with the excellence of some ideal good—say, for instance, with the truth and sublimity of some noble thought—this emotion acts, with psychological necessity, upon the functions of effort and volition, and may, in itself, incite the will to actions which naturally have some bearing upon the thought that inspired them, but which are not necessarily performed with a view to the advantage either of self or of others. It is true

that actions of this kind usually yield some result beneficial to the welfare either of the individual or of the whole race, and the often-repeated observation of this fact leads us to look upon this virtual result as the end desired by the acting subject. This, however, is a confusion of objective and subjective matters which, from a psychological standpoint, is by no means justifiable.

What in this respect holds true of feeling may likewise be applied to the remaining forms of interest: memory of value and judgment of value—provided, of course, that they are true valuations which have sprung from the warm soil of feeling, and with the expressed limitation that as to their immediate motive power these forms of interest are inferior to actual feelings.

What has been said above ought to be sufficient proof that our view of the matter, although it traces back all striving and volition to interest, and this again to feelings, includes by no means the concession that all human activity is based on selfish or eudæmonistic motives.

Ethical valuation independent of the result of the action.

Nor does it follow from this view of the matter that the *ethical valuation* of human activity

has to look for its standard judgment to the "result" of an action in respect to the pleasure or displeasure it affords. This is an erroneous conclusion drawn repeatedly from the same or similar premises. Even Lotze, whose philosophy everywhere else bears the character of true idealism, subscribes, in this point, to eudæmonism, and is here unjustly polemical against Herbart, who in agreement with Kant held that the ethical valuation of our actions should be independent of all eudæmonistic considerations. It must be acknowledged that Lotze is perfectly right in accusing the Herbartian view of having failed to trace back the ethical judgments of value that are to govern moral actions, to their respective *feelings*, in which alone, originally, all value and lack of value makes itself perceptible, and on which, therefore, is based all ethical approval and disapproval. He is wrong, however, when, on account of this connection of the judgments of value with feelings, he claims that the ethical value and the ethical valuation of human activity should depend on the ensuing effects of pleasure and displeasure; and he is also wrong when he censures Herbart for ac-

Discrimination as to the correctness of the Lotzian and Herbartian views.

knowledging "absolute" moral values independent of every effect of this kind.*

In this respect the ethical values and valuations bear great resemblance to the æsthetical values and valuations. The value of the beautiful, too, manifests itself to the mind originally only through æsthetic feelings of pleasure and displeasure, but quite immediately and absolutely, i.e., without any consideration of ends that it is ultimately to produce.

Ethical satisfaction derived from noble purpose.

Likewise, there are conditions and expressions of will that immediately appeal to, or offend, our moral feeling without the mediation of reflection on the effects of pleasure or displeasure that ensue from them in favor of the acting person or of his fellow men. Even in cases where the action is crowned with the grandest success, when,

* "We cannot agree with Herbart when he admitted forms of activity possessing in themselves absolute value, and, accordingly, obligatory force free from all consideration of the result from their execution. Whatever the intimate relationship between the moral laws and the feelings of pleasure and displeasure may be, it is at least certain that there exists some inextricable connection between them, and that all speaking of absolutely obligatory forms of activity having no relation to the ensuing result is a perhaps very well meant but utterly erroneous formalism." (Lotze, Grundzüge d. prakt. Philosophie, 2. Aufl., S. 12 f.)

for instance, great and lasting blessings for the human race result from a noble deed of charity, the ethical satisfaction does not extend to these results as such, but is derived solely from the noble purpose, which was the source of the action and of its consequences. It is, of course, not to be denied that these results, too, arouse delight in us, and that this delight often goes hand in hand with ethical valuation; but we deny that it is for this reason identical with ethical valuation.

IV.

PEDAGOGICAL INFERENCES AND APPLICATIONS.

Interest a fundamental principle of education.

The great pedagogical importance of interest follows quite immediately from the psychological premises established by the previous sections. The fact that the whole range of the associative processes, as was shown in our second section, as well as attention, and retentiveness of the memory, and indeed all spontaneous and happy devotion to school work, is dependent upon interest, makes it evident that interest is of special significance for the intellectual results of school instruction. At the same time the fact that all the motives of conscious effort and volition depend on interest, as shown in Section III, causes interest to assume, from an educational standpoint, the significance of a *cardinal concept* of pedagogy, of a *fundamental principle*, on

whose proper recognition depends more than on anything else the educational success of school instruction as well as the success of home training. In whatever direction the predominating interests of a man incline, thither also tend, with psychological necessity, his striving and volition. In proportion as the lower and sensuous interests, or the higher and ideal interests predominate, volition will, in its fundamental tendency at least, be drawn toward the lower or the higher experiences of life. And according as education secures or fails to secure to the ideal interests in the child's mental life their proper ascendancy over the sensuous interest, education will either accomplish or neglect its mission of leading the child's will along the pathway of virtue.

Education cannot do everything.

By this, however, we do not mean to say that education is omnipotent. At the beginning of its existence the soul of the child is by no means, as Herbart thought, a *tabula rasa*, upon which education may write whatever it pleases; but various innate (hereditary) traits outline for education, up to certain limits, its development, and condition in particular the gradually awakening interests, so that, in this respect, limitations

are set to education, of which the educator should always be conscious. On the other hand, however, they are wrong who, in agreement with *Kant* and *Schopenhauer*, maintain that man's character is fully determined *a priori* by innate qualities, so that education could not materially influence its development. Such a view is contrary to the facts established by experience, and particularly to all the laws of natural growth. According to these laws all genesis and growth start from within, and are in their progress steadily dependent upon their original causes; but they are, at the same time, frequently influenced and modified by external causes that are brought into play at a later stage. In the same manner the development of human character and, in particular, the development of its ruling interests, with which we are concerned here, depend, without doubt, not only on the original dispositions, but to a great extent also, on influences setting in at a later stage, especially on those due to education.

Advantages and disadvantages of the mind's plasticity.

This susceptibility, it is true, at once puts up a new barrier to the influence of education, and since education, as a rule, ceases long before the

man attains his full growth and development, the very plasticity of human nature becomes a danger. It is wholly possible that the beneficial influences which a good education has exercised upon the child will, at the conclusion of his education, be entirely or in part destroyed by opposite influences, and that the higher interests in particular, planted by education in the child's mind, will be choked by a luxuriant growth of lower, immoral interests. The educator, of course, ought to be aware of this danger, and of the limits of his influence; under no circumstances, however, should he become discouraged, but he must have the firm confidence that a good sowing brings in most cases a good harvest, and that a child's mind which has been well directed throughout the entire period of education will not deviate from the right path except under the most unfavorable conditions.

The practical side of education.

Perhaps one might raise the objection here that in education, inasmuch as it aims at lasting results which shall be felt throughout life, it is less important to interest the affective side of the child's consciousness in the good than to make him firm in his will and to fit him for action by

systematically accustoming and training him to the actual performance of what is good. Without doubt this side of education is of great importance, and education misses the mark if it does not do its duty in this direction. Lively interest in the good, which can be awakened in the child by suitable influence (see p.), produces, it is true, with psychological necessity, a *disposition*, a *striving* for the good. But this noble tendency does not always of itself develop into corresponding *desires* and *actions*, either because it lacks an opportunity for action, or because the child's energy is not sufficient to overcome the motives (interests) that are opposed to the good. Education, therefore, must exert its influence here by weakening the motives (interests) that are opposed to the good, through appropriate means of discipline, training, etc.; by providing for the child an opportunity to manifest his good tendencies in practice, and by steadily exercising him in the actual performance of what is right. Only thus will education assist him in obtaining that firmness of will and reliability of action which constitute the essence of character.

On the other hand we must never forget that all practice and training miss the mark unless the educator finds in the heart of the child that propensity for good which springs from interest in the good. Conduct externally good may, it is true, be enforced without this by practice and discipline; but inasmuch as the conduct is forced, neither has it any moral value nor will it be of duration when compulsion ceases. Truly valuable and lasting fruits can be obtained by education only when it allows practice and discipline always to be accompanied by that more *inward* influence which makes the child's heart incline to the good, which quickens his thought, his feeling for the good, which, in short, arouses in him a lively interest in all goodness. It is only in this interest that there lies the power of a free and virtuous activity having its source within.

Aims of instruction.

Let us now further inquire what education can on its part contribute towards awakening and cultivating a lively interest in the good, and that, first of all, through instruction. It is, at present, generally admitted that the object of instruction is not only imparting of knowledge and mental culture, but likewise moral training.

But with regard to moral training, it is one of the main tasks of instruction to awaken interest in everything good—the term "good" being taken here in its broadest sense. The demand that instruction is to quicken the pupil's interest is frequently conceived in the narrow sense that instruction should be made "interesting," which is to say that joy and pleasure in study, in the acquisition of knowledge, and in mental progress, should be aroused in the pupil. Such "intellectual" interest is, without doubt, of great importance, not only for the purpose of insuring intellectual success to instruction, but also for educational purposes ; and the demand cannot be urged too strongly that through instruction—by the selection of appropriate subject-matter, by solicitude for its clear understanding, by provision for the self-activity of the pupil, etc.,—this intellectual pleasure be fully aroused.

Intellectual interest not sufficient.

On the other hand, however, the fact must be forcibly emphasized that thus far only a small segment of the entire circle of demand in question has been filled. That demand comprises not only the intellectual interest, but all ideal

interests; in the first place the religious-ethical, then also the sympathetic, patriotic, and æsthetic interests. To awaken and to cultivate all these interests instruction not only has many opportunities, but has, doubtless, also the most serious obligation.

In order to discharge this duty, instruction must not be satisfied with mere learning, knowing, and understanding. It is true that we evidently cannot do without them. Since we are unable, on any occasion, to esteem a thing without knowing something about it, interest in ideal things can rise in a child only on his being informed about ideal things. Much also depends on the quality of this knowledge and understanding. It must be clear and true, in order that a clear and accurate judgment of value may follow it, and it ought also to be indelibly impressed upon memory, in order that the accompanying valuation may be lasting. Yet knowledge, understanding, alone is not sufficient, however clear, true, and well remembered. It is, at the bottom, only a necessary premise, an indispensable condition of interest, without including or being able to create interest. Not in the cold domain

Knowledge only a necessary condition of interest.

of thought is the primitive source of interest to be found, but in the warm bosom of the feelings, through which alone, in an original and real manner, all value of things impressively discloses itself to the human mind (see above, Section I, p. 11). If, therefore, instruction is to produce in the child true interest in the good, it must take care that knowledge and understanding may be associated with a corresponding feeling; that the child's heart and mind may be warmed for the good, and that all those feelings through which the value of the good manifests itself to the human mind, may be awakened and cultivated. The question as to what may be contributed by instruction to the cultivation of the ideal interests is essentially this: How may instruction exercise impelling and prompting influence upon the nobler feelings, or, which is the same thing, upon the heart of the child ?

Requirements of instruction.

Whether, and to what extent, instruction is suitable for this task materially depends, in the first place, on the arrangement of the plan of instruction—selection and arrangement of the matter of instruction, aim of instruction, amount of daily school work, etc. In this respect the

first requisite is that only those branches and subjects of instruction should be admitted to which the pupil's apperceptive powers are fully equal. This comprises the twofold demand, (1) that the subjects to be treated shall be adapted to the mental capacity of the pupil, that in each grade, without exception, only those things shall be taught for whose mental digestion the faculties of the pupil (intelligence, power of utterance, etc.) are sufficiently matured; and (2) that these material starting-points—namely, ideas, observations, experiences, conceptions, etc.—which each new matter of instruction presupposes for its clear understanding, should be present in the pupil's mind, or should, as far as possible, be put into his possession for this purpose. On the prompt fulfilment of these requirements—whose meaning and scope it is not our task to discuss in every detail—depends absolutely all success of instruction in general, and particularly every kind of interest to be awakened by instruction.

Pupils' capabilities must be regarded.

As to the intellectual interest, enough has been said above (see p. 15), and a further specification is not required. It is evident that

this kind of interest depends entirely on success in mental work, and that at the bottom it is nothing else than the pleasurable feeling resulting from mental progress such as waits upon every mental advance, upon every true and clear enlightenment. It is, therefore, excluded, from the outset, when subjects are treated which the pupil's mind is unable to digest. Likewise all other interests—religious, ethical, sympathetic, etc.—that come under consideration here are subject to the same condition. For instance, let the religious, literary, historical, etc., subjects of instruction be ever so well adapted to act upon the feeling, to awaken religious, ethical, etc., interests ; if they surpass the pupil's capacity, if his mind does not feel at home with them, they will never find an entrance to his heart. In this respect they closely resemble a sermon which, in all cases where it is beyond the comprehension of the audience, leaves their hearts untouched, however great its intrinsic value may be.

Our plans of instruction defective in many respects.

Do the plans of instruction in our schools meet, in every point, the demands that can be made in this respect ? Is, for instance, the read-

ing of Cæsar and of similar military writers used in our "gymnasia," with their descriptions of operations often entering into the minutest strategic details, adapted, in all its parts, to the apperceptive faculties of pupils who at the start are wholly unfamiliar with those things? Does not the systematic religious instruction that even in elementary schools* ventures on the most difficult problems of dogmatics, presuppose too much in many points? and does it not, by using catechetical artifices, only ostensibly explain what in reality is denied to the capacity of pupils of that age? And will not the demand—doubtlessly justifiable to a certain extent—for an ampler consideration of political economy and of the history of culture, have to remain unsatisfied as to many things that in this respect have been proposed as desirable? It must seem so, if we thoroughly consider whether, and to what extent, the range of ideas and interests of the pupil, especially that of the primary pupil, offers in subjects of this kind, the necessary foundation for a lastingly fruitful conception which enters

Certain ideas necessary for certain subjects

* Religious instruction is compulsory in all German schools.—*Ed.*

into the actual nature of the thing. This is not the place to answer these or similar questions fully; we simply desire to call attention to the fact that the popular demands made in regard to these studies stand on by no means so firm and questionless ground as is generally supposed.

The health of the pupil to be considered.

A further demand made of the school is that, in establishing plans of instruction, in adjusting the daily school work, etc., it take into consideration the health of the pupils. The saying, "Mens sana in sano corpore," holds not less true in regard to the emotional life than it does in regard to the intellect.* The normal susceptibility of mind, and the development of a healthy emotional life greatly depend on the soundness of the body. Irregularities in the state of the health of the body are, as a rule, followed by diseased states of the feelings, by feelings of ill temper, of over-excitement, fatigue, etc.; and these hamper and disturb the free development of those very feelings and interests which instruction is to awaken.

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* What Ostermann wishes to emphasize is that it is just as true of the emotions as of the intellect, and also its importance with regard to the emotions—*Ed.*

What the school, for its part, can contribute to the preservation of health is, before all things, this,—that in her requirements of the pupil she observe the proper measure. Owing to the intimate correlation existing between the psychical and physical processes, every excess of mental exertion is immediately followed by disturbances in the physical organism. If through an abnormally increased consumption of blood in the brain, such as follows excessive mental work, the necessary supply of nourishing blood-substance is withdrawn from the remaining parts of the body; or if the brain uses up more nerve-substance than can be secreted and restored in the right time, disturbances in the processes of metabolism arise which not only have consequences detrimental to health, but which also unfavorably influence the mind because of the feelings of fatigue, over-excitement, etc., that are connected with them. To this may be added the bad effects resulting from want of physical exercise, unavoidably connected with the overburdening of the schools: diminished breathing, disturbances in the circulation of the blood, indigestion, etc., things that necessarily cause much physical

Proper measure of requirements to be regarded.

Excessive demands exclude success.

and mental uneasiness. Woe to the school that by excessive demands becomes guilty of such deplorable results! It not only undermines the health of the children, but also deprives itself of the cream of its educational success. "Cheerfulness," says Jean Paul, "is the sky under which everything thrives, poison excepted; it is, at once, the soil and the blossom of virtue. Joyfulness, that feeling of a wholly untrammelled nature and life, opens the child's mind to take in the universe, causes all youthful powers to rise like the rays of the morning sun, and gives strength, whereas strength is taken away by sadness."

Moreover, the school should bear in mind this: that only the healthy, fresh, and cheerful mind of the child will disclose itself to the ideal effects of instruction with the proper susceptibility and joyfulness, and only in such a mind will that lively interest in everything good, such as is required for the foundation of all virtue, grow and bear fruit. The school, therefore, in destroying that natural cheerfulness by excessive demands upon the working faculty of the child, obstructs its own way to the heart of

the child, and ties the arteries of all successful educational influence.

Limit of working time.

Perhaps the objection might be raised here that really serious excesses of this kind could hardly occur in our humane times. As a matter of fact, however, these excesses are not at all rare. It is true the elementary school, and especially the rural elementary school, is, from the nature of the case, but slightly culpable; but in higher institutions, especially in the "gymnasia," we regret to say, the proper moderation is often lacking even to-day. When pupils of the middle classes of the "gymnasium" must, as the author himself has repeatedly observed, spend from three to four hours daily on their school work in addition to their regular six-hour school day, it is undoubtedly an excess of a good thing. Boys of that age should never be kept mentally active longer than from six to seven hours, or at the most from seven to eight hours daily.

In the good old times when each corps of teachers had its "original characters," by whom little or no studying was required either in school or for the school, and when instruction frequently gave opportunity for most exhilarating scenes, it

was not necessary to be so particular on this point. But at present, when the struggle for existence among academic teachers is raising more and more a professional class of able instructors, and when, consequently, school work is carried on everywhere with more energy, we ought to be more careful than formerly in apportioning both school tasks and outside work. This demand should be especially emphasized in the case of pupils still undergoing rapid growth. If at such an age the brain is abnormally accelerated in its development by forced mental work, nature will inevitably avenge itself by a premature halt and enervation—the sad reaction of all "precocity." Besides this, as already demonstrated, every excess of mental work inevitably injures the health, undermines the constitution, and weighs down the mind with that gloomy mood in which no fresh and healthy interest can thrive.

More free physical exercise necessary.

It is often said that by their gymnastic exercises the higher schools offer a sufficient counterpoise to the health-destroying effects of fatiguing mental work. As this is usually limited in the programs of instruction to two or three hours a

week, it is far from adequate to accomplish the desired effect. At least an hour daily would have to be devoted to it, and in addition to the regular gymnastics, "athletic sports" should be cultivated more extensively. Since the latter exercise the body more thoroughly than the often one-sided gymnastic limb exercises, and since, owing to the greater freedom from restraint in their management, and to the enjoyment and merriment which they produce, athletic sports have a more recreating and refreshing effect, and prove much more valuable from a sanitary point of view than the regular gymnastics.

On the other hand, the strict military management of the regular gymnastics, though it is, no doubt, a good school of discipline and of the will, yet through this very constraint and through the tediousness of many of its exercises, it fatigues the pupil more than it recreates and refreshes him. In this respect our higher institutions might learn a lesson from the English, who not only give a much greater scope in their schools to physical exercises in general, but also cultivate athletic sports in particular (such as lawn-tennis, cricket, football, rowing, etc.) more

Athletic sports in English schools.

ardently than the Germans, and that, too, with such success that the educated young people of England, in regard to physical ability and active interest in physical exercise, which they keep up throughout life, are far in advance of the Germans.

Examinations a school evil.

Among the school evils that injure health, and for this as well as for other reasons cripple not only the cheerfulness of youth but also the development of joyful interest in the lessons, belong the final examinations.* The anxiety they cause settles upon the last semesters in the higher institutions like a mildew, blighting all happy growth. They are a regular bugbear, and lead to a cramming and mental drudgery that consume the strength of the pupil, paralyze all sound interest, and often directly cause a disgust for learning that is in later life overcome with difficulty. And what is the use of it? That the pupil on leaving school shall have all his knowledge nicely ordered? But how long will it stay so? What had to be crammed in for examination—in outline, hurriedly and

* The author refers here especially to the "Arbiturienten Examen" which affords entrance to university study.—*Ed.*

without interest—is, in most cases, very speedily lost again. The school arrives at truly lasting knowledge only when it allows the pupil ample time to get thoroughly absorbed in his work, and it cannot arouse a lasting interest by the violent measure of examinations. But these, it is claimed, afford an indispensable standard for judging the ability of the graduating pupil! Indispensable, indeed? Teachers who for years have guided and observed the mental growth of their pupils would, we are to believe, be unable, in spite of all, to judge rightly of a pupil's ability without this farce of examination, in which a few minutes are decisive, and almost everything depends on chance! Miserable teachers they must be, and poor school authorities, who cannot, without such an exhibition, get an insight into the life and standing of a school! Such examinations, therefore, should be done away with. They are among the mortal enemies of educational school instruction, because under their rule all healthy interest dies away.*

Examinations as basis of ability.

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*Much of this may be said as equally true of many of our college examinations.—*Ed.*

Various interests to be aroused by instruction.

Herbart long since demanded that interest should be "many sided." What is meant by this is essentially what we have expressed on the foregoing pages, in the demand that by instruction all ideal interests should be aroused; not merely "intellectual" interest, which often is the only kind that people have in view. This demand and the logical conclusions derived from it in regard to the selection of the subjects of instruction, will have to be discussed here a little more fully. If we were concerned with intellectual interest only, little consideration would be required as to the selection of the subjects, for the pleasure resulting from knowledge and progress, in which this interest consists, is not confined to certain matters, but may be aroused more or less by every subject of instruction—provided, of course, that it is within the pupil's apprehensive faculty and is treated in such a manner as to warrant a clear understanding and a sure success.

The case stands different with the other interests in question—religious, ethical, æsthetical, sympathetic, etc.—each of which is based on certain apperceptive categories in such a manner

that much depends on a proper selection of the subjects of instruction and of the matter to be taught under them. While we do not wish to go into exhaustive detail, we must not pass over in silence a few points that are of especial importance in this respect.

Religious interest.

Whenever the educational effects of instruction are considered, pedagogy, with good reason, places religious instruction in the foreground. Religious interest, which naturally religious instruction, more than any other department of instruction, is fitted to arouse, is the most important of all interests, in the same manner as religion itself is the foundation of all virtue. Of course, no theoretical interests of a theological complexion enter into the question here. What we have in mind is merely that immediate, purely religious interest that springs from, or consists in, religious feeling; that awe innate in the mind, that reverence of God indwelling in the heart, without which all religion remains a dead affair of the head, powerless to sway the will or mould the life. Instruction in religion, it is true, has not so great power to awaken a vital interest in the hearts of children as has actual

life, with its educational advantages of personal intercourse and personal example, etc., appealing most strongly to the feelings; but, nevertheless, the influence of religious instruction is sufficiently far-reaching in this respect. Moreover, owing to the intimate relations that exist between religion and the moral questions of life, religious instruction offers abundant opportunity for the quickening of ethical interests, namely, pleasure in what is morally good and disgust for what is morally objectionable; thus affording a double reason for placing it high in educational significance.

Requirements of religious instruction.

From this point of view, it is true that all religious subjects have by no means the same value, and a careful sifting is needed. In the good old times the pith of religious instruction was thought to consist in learning by heart the greatest possible amount of religious lore, and in the vast quantity to be mastered it was only too natural that much unintelligible and half-understood matter should creep in. That was the surest way of alienating young hearts from religion and of cultivating that lifeless lip Christianity from which our nation has been suffering

so long. At present, matters are somewhat improved, although there is still much to be desired. Requiring pupils of the lower grades to memorize the abstruse text of the catechism and to recite it again and again long before it can be understood, is a mal-practice still frequently to be seen, which cannot be condemned with enough severity. Not only does such obscure, dead knowledge leave the child's heart untouched, but, owing to the mental torture of mechanical cramming, it is disgusting to the child and causes him to have an aversion for religious matters in general.

Although in the higher grades systematic religious instruction is not wanting in "explanation," it frequently errs in other ways. Sometimes the children are afflicted with dogmatic subtleties that are equally far from their understanding and their interest; sometimes even simple and intelligible things are made unbearable by all kinds of logical distinctions, definitions, and classifications. On all occasions—in the primary school, at least—the systematic matter of instruction should be limited to what is absolutely necessary. "Before the age of

Abstract matters unfit for elementary schools.

puberty the boy is qualified for no strictly abstract instruction," says Diesterweg; "he comprehends only concrete things. Abstract things may be forced upon him, but they will not live for him." Quite right: they will possess no life to the child. For the very reason that he does not feel at home with abstract matters, his heart remains untouched by them; and even if the child comprehends them wholly or in part, they make little or no impression on his heart. The more religious instruction merges into theory and abstract knowledge, the further it wanders from its proper mission, that of awakening religious interest. It is, above all else, actual facts and acting persons that make an impression on the child. "Example is better than precept. Life is kindled only from life; hence the best in a child is kindled only by example, either present or historical."

Sacred history.

Sacred history, therefore, should dominate religious instruction. Not only should it be given the greatest possible scope, but all doctrinal and discursive matters, so far as they have to be introduced, ought to be based upon and deduced from sacred history. Only on this

concrete basis and in this living connection do doctrinal discussions of religious questions become valuable and justifiable for children. Indeed, even the field of sacred history should be subjected to more selection and sifting than is generally done. Especially from the history of the Old Testament many things that are now taught in the schools should be eliminated, either because they are objectionable in regard to ethics or because they are of a purely scientific value (archæological, ethnological, etc.), and leave the religious-ethical interests untouched.

The life of Christ and the lives of pious men.

It is evident that the history of the life and passion of the Saviour belongs in the foreground of the whole, both on account of its significance in the doctrine of salvation and because it is suited more than anything else to affect the hearts of children, to fill them with fervent love for God and Christ, and to win them over to the truths of Christianity. Biblical history might be supplemented very profitably by various edifying biographical sketches from the lives of pious men of later times, martyrs, champions of faith and charity, of whom, unfortunately, little is heard in religious instruction.

"The best Christian religious teaching is the life of Christ, and next to this the sufferings and death of his followers, even when told outside of the Scriptures." (Jean Paul.) Nor will any one deny that spiritual poetry, as well as the reading of well-chosen poetical and didactic selections from the Bible—the choicest of the Psalms, the most popular and important passages from the prophets of the Old Testament, the parables of Christ, the Sermon on the Mount, etc.—are well adapted to have an edifying influence on the minds of children, and to quicken their religious interest.

Educational effects derived from the reading matter.

Next to religious instruction, the reading matter of the language lessons is suited to produce educational effects. If selected properly and treated with animation, it proves an inexhaustible source of ideal inspiration. By the telling and singing of "all sweet things that thrill the human breast, and of all noble things that elevate man's heart," * it stimulates all the higher feelings and directs the interest from the commonplace to the ideal things of life, to everything that is great, beautiful, and noble.

* Uhland, in "The Singer's Curse."—*Ed.*

Greek and Roman literature unduly favored.

Reading has a very wide scope in our "gymnasia," though, unfortunately, it is not the national, but the Greek and Roman literature, that dominates here. The classical, no doubt, is of ideal value in education; but in this respect it cannot compare with our own literature, and therefore should yield the preference to our literature in the schools. It is a fact that, at the re-awakening of the humanistic studies at the end of the Middle Ages, all better minds turned in that direction, and that, consequently, in the great school reform which, in league with humanism, soon afterwards set the Reformation going, the old classics were put strongly in the foreground. These things seem reasonable and just when we consider the miserable condition of German literature at that period.

At present, however, affairs are different. Now, happily, we Germans possess a literature of our own, which not only can compare favorably with the ancient classical literature, the best of which it has absorbed, but undoubtedly far surpasses that literature in richness of thought and in profound ideal worth. In the face of this, then, why do we so unduly favor the

ancients? And if reading, as is pretty generally admitted, ought first of all to bring about educational effects of an ideal kind, must not, then, the first place be given to national literature, for the very reason that it is far more appropriate to the mind of the pupil—that it is German both in its language and in all its thoughts and feelings, and therefore affects German hearts far more deeply and lastingly than can the spirit of antiquity, which in many respects is at variance with the German character? Besides, we must not forget that the truly great, beautiful, and exalting in ancient literature can by no means bear with full force upon the mind of the pupil, because in reading the classics he has to struggle steadily with difficulties of vocabulary and grammar, and for this reason imbibes the spirit of the author only in a most fragmentary way, or, as it were, in homœopathic doses. Under these circumstances, plunging with enthusiasm into the spirit of the writings, and receiving that immediate impression which is required whenever the mind is to be deeply affected, are out of the question. The reading of German literature, provided a proper

National literature to be preferred.

choice is made for each grade, moves free of these embarrassing fetters, and for this reason the spirit of the reading matter speaks more immediately and more acceptably to the hearts of the pupils.

Greek and Latin versus national literature.

Perhaps the objection will be raised that the inferiority of the ancient classics, which on this point must be admitted, is compensated for by their disciplinary value; in which respect, just on account of their formal difficulties, they excel the German literature. Although it must be admitted that the overcoming of such difficulties is an effective means of mental gymnastics, yet, on the other hand, it must be emphasized that in other ways German literature is better adapted to produce educational effects. The greatest benefit to the pupil's intellect to be derived from reading, consists not in his learning how to construct and analyze sentence after sentence correctly, but in his learning to grasp the spirit of the author as a whole; in getting a clear insight into the train of thought, and the connection of the whole; in understanding the characters rightly; in tracing out the leading ideas and becoming able to reproduce all this coherently.

For this kind of mental training the reading of the ancient classics is undoubtedly less adapted than that of national authors, because in the former a comprehensive conception of the whole is too much weighted by the ballast of philological formalities.

The national literature affords abundance of reading matter.

Those who are to some extent familiar with literature need no especial proof that German literature, in addition to that which is now commonly read in higher institutions of learning, offers an abundance of suitable, and in every respect valuable, reading matter for young people.

The other question, where and how the study of ancient classics could be limited in favor of German literature, is more difficult to answer. Where we are dealing with principles only, is not the place to give detailed suggestions on this point. Before thorough reforms in this respect can be made possible, the old prejudice, still deeply rooted in wide circles, that both as to form and ideas no other matter can compare with the ancient classics in educational value, will have to be eradicated; and all appearances seem to indicate that this will soon be effected. If,

then, only the standpoint of indispensableness and utility is to have any weight in the question, the ancient languages, judged by this standard, will not be able *forever* to maintain their present high standing. Under the existing educational conditions, Latin will for some time, though to a less extent, continue to be employed as an indispensable factor of education in our "gymnasia"; Greek, however, as a compulsory subject of instruction at least, will probably soon have to be omitted from our higher institutions of learning. If we assume that the flower of Greek literature, for instance, the poems of Homer, will, in a standard translation, continue to be accessible to student youth, and if we take into consideration that German reading could then be cultivated far more extensively, and could be made more productive for the ideal aims of education, we ought not to lament the departure of Greek, but ought rather to be glad of it.

French and English literature.

The case of the old classics is essentially different from that of French and English literature, as the latter *predominate* in the "Realschulen." Though they, too, for similar reasons, are inferior to German literature in

ideal educational value, yet such weighty arguments of a practical nature speak in their favor that here retrenchment of them in favor of German literature can scarcely be thought of.

The elementary school, as regards literature for instruction in language, is restricted entirely to its reading-book. To be sure, the regulation school readers offer much that is beautiful, heart-stirring, and elevating; yet in comparison with the higher institutions the elementary school has the decided disadvantage that it has not, in addition to the variety of short poems and prose readings contained in the readers, some longer selections, into which the pupil might enter more deeply and with truer feeling. If, through reading, a profound and lasting interest in the ideal things of life is to be awakened in the child's heart, it will not be sufficient, among the confused succession of subjects and impressions, to touch only hastily, here and there, a chord of his emotional life; besides this, matters of a larger compass will have to be offered, in which the pupil's heart and intellect may become lastingly absorbed, and with whose great heroes and sublime ideas he may gradually coalesce, as it were.

School readers.

We have not in view here classical dramas and similar works beyond the understanding of children, but some of the excellent juvenile books, lucid biographies of the great men in history, narratives about pious and noble persons, etc., such as our juvenile literature presents in rich variety. If left to the private industry of the children, such literature would remain sealed to most of them, owing to the peculiar conditions of family life existing among those classes of people with whom we are here concerned.

Literature for reading matter.

Moreover, it is evident that literature can be made far more productive in school than at home for the ideal aims of education. It must be admitted that there are practical difficulties in the way of introducing such writings into the primary school; but these difficulties can and will be overcome as soon as we reach an agreement as to the great ideal value of the matter. The reading of "Robinson Crusoe" in the schools of the Herbart-Ziller type has been greatly ridiculed; but even if we admit that the selection of this particular work is open to objection, yet the principle on which it was intro-

duced is clearly recognizable as an idea of undoubtedly high value, and in its practical application a happy beginning has been made that is worthy of general imitation.

History.

Among the subjects adapted to awaken in young people a lasting interest for the ideal things of life, history occupies a prominent place. It offers an abundance of typical instances, striking examples of the courage of conviction, of intrepid love of truth, of noble self-denial, and of all other virtues, and thus may be used most profitably to quicken ethical interest. Moreover, by familiarizing the child with the history of his country, by acquainting him with its great deeds and heroes, by setting up before him numerous examples of devoted love of country, it proves a most effective means of inspiring patriotism and of kindling national interest. That this ideal effect and not historical knowledge is the main point in the teaching of history is a settled thing with the pedagogy of the elementary school.

Ideal effect, not historical knowledge, the main point.

A consequence of the general agreement on this point is the gratifying fact that the tabular treatment of history previously employed in

elementary schools has been almost generally superseded by the biographical manner of presentation. This method—or, more exactly, this manner of selecting and arranging the matter—in forbearing to treat everything at full length, and in confining itself to the more important occurrences, especially to the leading factors of the great historical events, has the inestimable advantage of being able to treat these selected matters exhaustively and in a clear and animated style, and especially of being able to color them with little accessory circumstances and with concrete particulars, so that the child not only comprehends them with his intellect, but lives them over in his imagination and is moved by them in heart. Only thus is it possible to awaken in children's hearts a lively interest in great men and the great deeds of history. If children are fed with general summaries and dry text-book notes—as is inevitable when everything is to be treated with equal fulness—the heart gets nothing. If, for instance, the story of the heroic death of Gustavus Adolphus at Lutzen is dispatched with the usual compendium phrase, "Here the king was killed

How to teach history.

Illustration as to method.

while engaged in a heroic fight at the head of brave Swedes," what is there for imagination to call up—what for the heart to feel? Nothing whatever. Let the teacher, however, like a poet, make a graphic sketch of the event, relating with animation how the king in his impetuosity ventures into the midst of the enemy; how a hostile soldier on recognizing him takes aim at him and wounds him in the arm, so that the blood gushes out; how the king, in order to quiet his terrified retinue, bravely suppressing his pain, calls out: "It is nothing, children, follow me," and immediately afterwards sinks to the ground fatally wounded by a second bullet, and dying, says to his attendant, the Duke of Lauenburg, "It is enough for me, my brother, save your own life"; how, thereupon, the king's horse, without its rider and bespattered with blood, dashes across the battlefield and so announces to the Swedes the death of their beloved king, etc. Let the teacher in this way transform the event into a real picture; then, and only then, does the child actually experience in his imagination the thrilling situation, and his heart is actually seized by the grandeur of the

moment, by the greatness and the valor of the heroes, so that he can never lose his interest in it.

The art of picturing in detail.

In like manner, characterization should, by vivid picturing of detail, bring the character of historical persons into clear relief. For instance, if Emperor Wilhelm I. is the subject under treatment, the teacher should not comment on his loyalty, his humanity, etc., in general terms, but should tell the children such short stories from the life of the emperor, or such remarks made by him, as furnish concrete examples of those traits. Rousseau very truly remarks: "The expression of countenance does not consist in the prominent lineaments, nor does character express itself in the great actions; it is in the minor matters that our nature reveals itself." For this reason he praises the historical style of Plutarch, "who possesses an inimitable charm of depicting great men in small things." This art of picturing in detail is of the greatest importance, especially when children are to be instructed in history, since concrete and individual matters make a greater impression upon them than general matters. The participation of the

child's mind in the teacher's narrative, and, accordingly, his interest in it, depend entirely on the degree in which he is enabled by the speaker to fancy himself in the same situation, to picture vividly the events and persons described, and actually to live over in his imagination the things which the teacher relates. It is, as before said, one of the greatest advantages of the biographical method that it largely employs picturing in detail, to which this effect is due.

The biographical method and cause and effect.

The objection frequently raised against the biographical method is that in utilizing it, the method based on tracing the relation of cause and effect is too much neglected. This objection, however, is of but little consequence when reference is made to the instruction in elementary schools. At this period children are not sufficiently advanced to perceive the relation between causes and their effects. But as far as such relation is really intelligible for children, and indispensable for the understanding of history, there is nothing to prevent the teacher from bringing the single biographical pictures into relation by means of appropriate transitions and connecting ideas. No judicious teacher,

even in the elementary school, would attempt to pass immediately over from the biography of Charlemagne, for instance, to that of Henry I. A few connecting remarks on the decay of the empire under the later Carlovingians, on the external enemies that were ravaging Germany at that time, etc., are here quite indispensable in order to show the historical significance of Henry I. Nor do they interfere in the least with the nature of the biographical method. Likewise, remarks on culture-history might be inserted now and then as opportunity affords, without in the least sacrificing the biographical methods of explanation.

History teaching in higher institutions.

It is, of course, quite justifiable that in higher institutions of learning greater stress be laid on the relation of cause and effect and fuller treatment be given to the history of civilization. Yet the biographical side should not be neglected to such an extent as is usual. It is to the very interest of the relation of cause and effect itself that the "personal side" of history should be forcibly placed in the foreground. Since the great events and crises of history are in the majority of cases most closely connected with

great personages, the former can never be fully understood without a thorough acquaintance with the lives and characteristic traits of the latter. Think, for instance, of a man like Luther, or like Bismarck, whose personal history and individual peculiarities stand in so intimate a relation to the great historical crises which they brought about, that a truly pragmatic conception and explanation of those crises is possible only on the basis of a clear insight into the personal history of the men. Add to this the ideal point of view which in the higher institutions also ought to be decisive in all questions of the kind, namely, that the biographical treatment of history entering into personal and individual affairs captivates interest in a most lively manner, and is suited more than any other means, to arouse what Goethe calls "the cream of instruction in history," viz., inspiration. Would that teachers might at last make up their minds to reduce to what is actually necessary, the immense ballast of historical dates and numbers with which the pupils of higher schools are still burdened, and the greater part of which are quite superfluous even for an educated person.

By so doing, time would be gained for a more searching treatment of pivotal events and personalities, a more lively and enlivening treatment of history.

Importance of national history.

The same reasons that have been already adduced in favor of national literature, hold strongly with reference to instruction in history, namely, that the national history should be placed in the foreground. To this may be added the further important reason that patriotism, the love of one's own country, the interest in the life of one's own nation, is evidently aroused more effectively by the history of one's own people than by the history of foreign countries. In elementary schools, or in those, at least, where instruction in history has to be limited to a single course in the highest grade, and where accordingly only a minimum of time is given to it, we ought to confine ourselves exclusively to the history of the particular country and the nation. The history of other nations should be considered only in so far as it is indispensable to the understanding of our own history. The great crises of ancient history, such as are connected with the names of Nebuchadnezzar, Cyrus, Alexander,

etc., may find ample consideration in occasional references when studying the biblical history of the Old Testament.

Extent to which the history of other nations should be considered.

It is evident that in better-organized schools the history of foreign countries ought to be treated more fully; yet we think that even here the history of our own country should occupy a more prominent place than it usually does. For higher schools, too, the words of the poet hold true: "Attach thyself to thy dear native country; cling to her with all thy heart; in this are the firm roots of thy strength."* Moreover, the broader the instruction in history is spread out, the more the possible opportunity is lost of entering into a closer consideration of the single events of importance; and thus the study of history is made to swerve from its highest aim, namely, the arousing of a deep and lasting interest in all that is essentially great in history.

Interest in nature.

Among those valuations on which the kindness and generosity of the human mind are founded we also count all pure and genuine interest in nature. Not merely that intellectual interest

*Schiller.

which attaches to the acquirement of a knowledge of nature, of her phenomena, of her coherence, of her moving forces, etc., but also the æsthetic pleasure which we take in the grandeur and beauty of her works, the religious interest in all those things peculiar to her essence and working that direct our feeling and reason to a divine Originator, and finally the sympathy with all her creatures from the greatest to the smallest. This last sort of interest in nature is above all so intimately connected with the kindliness of the human mind that Berthold Auerbach was justified in saying that "The most infallible index of the refinement of heart possessed by peoples or individuals is the manner in which they treat their animals." It has often been emphasized by competent men that instruction in natural history ought to consider as its noblest task that of quickening these interests in young people. Nevertheless the practice of the schools leaves much to be desired in this respect. We are of the opinion that nature-study, and especially natural history, both in higher and lower schools, are too much involved in dead classifications and descriptions of external form, and lay too little

Rigid classifications opposed in Nature-study.

stress upon bringing nature home to the pupil's mind. The height and length of animals, expressed in centimeters, the number of their teeth, toes, vertebræ, etc., the number and form of the parts of plants (sepals, petals, anthers, etc.), frequently defined with shocking scientific accuracy—these and similar things are as a rule considered of main importance. Moreover, the clumsy nomenclature, in part quite unintelligible to children, with expressions like "lanceolate," "lineal-lanceolate," "pinnate," "runcinate"—such terms have unfortunately found their way from the compendiums even into the elementary schools, where they are not only entirely superfluous, but, in the majority of cases, quite unendurable. For this reason they can be forced upon the child only by violence, and remembered by him only a short time. These terms never become a lastingly useful possession to pupils. And setting aside this technical terminology, which with good intentions and a little common sense could easily be reduced to words that would be more intelligible to children, is it really necessary to cram the memory with all those minute distinctions of which, as we all

Technical terminology.

know from our own experience, only little is retained? We would by no means condemn a careful investigation of small particulars in nature, a thing which is often quite indispensable for an intelligent conception of the workings of nature, which quickens the powers of observation and promotes their æsthetic development; it is not, however, necessary that the technical names of each and every minutest feature should be impressed upon the mind. In order to recognize distinctly in nature the things observed in the class-room, and to make proper use of them in every-day life, the learning of a detailed nomenclature is not required so much as close, oft-repeated observation and self-drawn comparison. It is a fact that impressions gained through the eye are retained much longer than mere terms which have been committed to memory. If we could only make up our minds to curtail the teaching matter of natural history in the manner just explained, we should gain the time desired not only for bringing into greater prominence the educational effects of this branch of instruction, but also for more actively arousing interest in nature's creations by means of a sympathetic

Close observation and comparison the important thing.

study of all the modes of nature's manifestation. What an abundance of suggestive material, appealing, too, to the hearts of children, is offered in the habits and development of animals, even of the smallest of them. Think, for instance, of the bees and ants; and yet how much, as a rule, is this genial part of nature-study neglected in favor of a dry description of form. Accessible materials for effectively carrying on instruction of this kind are not wanting to the teacher. Mention need be made only of Brehm's "Illustriertes Tierleben," which offers an abundance of pertinent material. Short stories that tend to arouse sympathy for tortured animals may likewise find a place in the teaching in natural history. Only lately the Berlin Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals has published in its "Almanac for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals," a collection of stories such as no school—above all no elementary school—should ignore in the instruction in natural history. We call to mind the saying of the great Newton, to the effect that for a good and noble man not only is love towards his neighbor a sacred duty,

Material for nature-study suggested.

but also pity towards the dumb animals; we are reminded also of Schopenhauer's assertion that sympathy with animals is so closely connected with goodness of character that we may confidently maintain that whoever is cruel to animals cannot be a good man.

Natural relations between objects in nature.

Natural history, moreover, promotes a more genial conception of nature by leading pupils to see, as far as is practical, the connections and relationships existing between objects in nature; by this we do not understand any systematic relation such as is established by scientists by means of abstraction, but those natural relations of mutual dependence and coherence which present themselves in the reality of living nature. Aside from the pleasures arising from the acquirement of knowledge, which this manner of studying nature affords, it leads quite naturally to a treatment of the objects of nature in the form of complete pictures, as the woods, the field, the meadow, the heath, the sea, the mountains, etc., and thus brings into due prominence also the æsthetic side of nature. In this respect, such study closely resembles the descriptions of

nature in geography, which likewise are intended to produce an æsthetic effect. *

Natural history, and religious interest.

Natural history, finally, is useful in awakening the religious interest, and this is true in two respects. First, wherever the subject is practically taught, the expediency of natural processes, their uniformity, and their conformity to law are pointed out; and thus there is aroused that admiration of the Creator to which any person of unprejudiced feelings is led by a sympathetic contemplation of nature. And, secondly, by means of this study, "the limits of our knowledge of nature"† are in their proper time brought before the pupil's consciousness. That there are such limits, and that human intelligence is not capable of comprehending to the full extent the true nature of things as they are and as they occur from natural causes, is candidly admitted

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* Hints and aids for a study of nature in this manner are given by Rossmaessler in the "Vier Jahreszeiten," by Masius in his "Naturstudien," by Grube in his "Biographien aus der Naturkunde," by Junge in his "Dorfteich als Lebensgemeinschaft," by Wegener in his "Methodik des naturgeschichtlichen Unterrichts (Lehrbuch der Pädagogik, von Ostermann und Wegener, II. Teil), and by others.

† Helmholtz.

Nature study reveals the limits of our knowledge.

even by the greatest thinkers and investigators of the present age—by a Tyndall, Dubois Reymond, Helmholtz, Spencer, Fechner, Lotze, and others. As a single instance, we call attention to the words of the great natural philosopher, Tyndall, to the effect that when we have exhausted natural philosophy in every direction, then we are confronted with the greatest of secrets, eternally beyond the comprehension of the human mind.

Instruction in natural philosophy, especially in elementary schools, cannot lead the pupils to those depths of investigation where the limits of comprehension are felt by the mind of a great thinker; but for this very reason instruction in natural history, and more particularly in physics, is likely to lead to the dangerous delusion that everything in nature, without exception, may be explained from mechanical laws. There is, then, the more reason why we should not neglect to call attention, at the proper place, to the fact that limits are set to the knowledge of the investigating mind; that nature, in reality, is not what it appears to be to our senses, and that what natural phi-

losophers term "matter," "atom," "force," etc., are, at the bottom, only words for things that are not, and cannot be, understood. Only thus does the instruction in nature-study become in miniature a true and faithful mirror of "natural science," whose task, as Tyndall so beautifully remarks, "is not to divest the universe of its wonders, but to point out the wonderful and mysterious in its phenomena." And only thus does nature-study save the pupil from falling into materialistic errors, and secure that genuine religious interest which never ceases devoutly to recognize the limits of humanity, and to look up in adoration to a Creator surpassing all human understanding.

Singing.

Instruction in singing, too, co-operates in accomplishing in the ideal aim of school education, a part which by no means must be underrated. Not only does it quicken the sense for the beautiful in music, and thus promote the æsthetic interest, but simultaneously with the singing of the song a valuable and soul-inspiring poetical subject finds expression, which, through this very blending of the thought with the charm of the melody, seizes the feeling with double

force. Hence singing proves a most important means of arousing not only the æsthetical, but also all other ideal, interests.

Selection of songs.

No further arguments are needed to show that instruction in singing, in order to be fully effective in this respect, must select songs (spiritual as well as secular songs) of acknowledged beauty, and only such as in regard to their contents, as well as their style and melody, are fully adapted to the capacity of children. As should be done with the "grammatical parts" in instruction in German, so in singing, the purely "technical parts" should be limited to what is actually indispensable. Elementary technical training—especially for the purpose of securing a good intonation and musical accentuation—cannot be entirely dispensed with even in a primary school; but if too much attention is given to this training, the singing lessons become tedious to the pupil, and their educational effect is impaired. Music-reading, in our estimation, belongs only to higher institutions, not to the primary school. Experience teaches that even without this expedient, i.e., through purely oral practicing, instruction in singing in the primary schools can fully

The technical part of singing.

accomplish its object. It is, moreover, not possible, without seriously neglecting the ideal objects of singing, to devote to the study of notes so much time and care as are required for obtaining a really lasting proficiency in the art of sight-reading. Nor can "singing as an art" claim a place in the primary school. Here the proper field of singing is, along with hymns, the folk-songs.

Memorizing the words of songs.

And in order that grown-up people, too, may adhere to these songs, and continue to be inspired and elevated by them, the school should never neglect to have the words of the songs as well as the melody thoroughly memorized, so that they may be always retained. It is a great pity that grown-up people should neglect the precious folk-songs and should sing in their place the vulgar street-songs, for no other reason than that the words, which were not learned well enough at school, have been forgotten.

Drawing.

For animating the æsthetic interest, instruction in drawing, too, is not without consequence. It is true that its importance is greatly lessened by the formalism of our modern methods of

drawing, which emphasize the representation of dead, elementary forms (drawing of lines, geometrical figures, ornaments, etc.) to such a degree as to render drawing disagreeable to children.

No doubt the artist must necessarily master the technical elements; in the school, however, we have to deal with amateurs, with whom the purely technical part is much less to be sought than joy and pleasure in the thing itself and a certain ability of rendering real objects in drawing. Similar conditions exist here as in the instruction on the piano, where the technical part is likewise put in the foreground, as if we were aiming to educate virtuosos; and, in doing so, that which is essential for an amateur—the ability to read music and the æsthetic interest in music—is often sadly neglected. This is an impropriety of method which springs from a propensity characteristic of the Germans and laudable in itself—to do everything very thoroughly. In instruction, however, even in scientific subjects, the result very often occurs that not only the practical end is disregarded, but also the interest in the thing is weakened.

The technical element too much insisted on.

The relation of interest to the other subjects.

The remaining subjects, as arithmetic, higher mathematics, etc.—not to detract from their formal and practical value, which we very highly esteem, especially as regards mathematics—have not sufficient weight along the line here under consideration to claim an exhaustive treatment. Their significance for the intellectual interest has, moreover, been pointed out in other places.

Interest dependent on method of treatment.

The discussion in this section up to this point has dealt more especially with the "what" than the "how" of instruction—more with the selection of the matter of instruction than with its methodical treatment. That the pupil's interest in instruction likewise depends on the latter, and the manner of this dependence, will briefly be shown in the following:

One of the essential conditions of this interest, as pointed out heretofore (see p. 88) is the clear understanding of what is taught and learned at school. We saw that on this condition directly depends that pleasure and cheerfulness in mental work which we designated as "intellectual interest," and, indirectly, also every other kind of ideal interest; since only that which the intellect of the pupil comprehends can find an entrance

into the domain of feeling, and thus lead to a development of true interest. Whether now the pupil clearly comprehends the matter of instruction depends more on the nature of the subject itself (see p. 88) than on the manner in which it is presented.

The matter of instruction may be fully within the capacity of the pupil and yet not be properly comprehended and mentally digested by him, because he is not properly initiated into the subject by his teacher. When, for instance, the teacher of mathematics, as is even now quite frequently the case, keeps on demonstrating instead of giving the pupil an opportunity to find out everything for himself by means of the dialogistic method and of appropriate questions whenever the pupil's conception is not clear; then it is no wonder if a great many of the pupils fall behind and, despairing of the possibility of progress, lose all interest in the subject.

Proper initiation of the pupil into the subject.

The usual excuse then made is that mathematics is only for a few gifted intellects; and yet experience plainly teaches that every normally endowed mind can see its way in mathe-

matics very well, provided it is properly guided in the manner described above.

How much the clear understanding of a subject depends in general on the method of teaching, on the proper manner of developing and apportioning the subject, on perspicuity in the method of procedure (sensuous perception of concrete things, examples in the case of grammatical and religious instruction, etc.), on the teacher's manner of expression and its conformity to the pupil's linguistic standpoint, etc.—all this, and many things besides, are too well known to need further discussion in this place.

Active participation of the pupil in the instruction.

Another important condition of the intellectual interest consists in active participation of the pupil himself in the instruction. Prolonged passiveness (as in the case when the teacher continues discussing a subject for hours) is entirely incompatible with the nature of the child, and the younger the pupil, the more disagreeable it is to him. His strong desire for activity demands participation, and only when this desire is satisfied in an appropriate manner, and thus, at the same time, the consciousness of his own power is aroused in him, will he be able to

follow the instruction with steady interest. For this reason the teacher should allow the pupil to be self-active whenever it is possible; to think, seek, find out, observe, show, speak, for himself. For this, every subject and every lesson offers abundant opportunity. All rational matters of instruction (such as general truths, rules, conceptions, laws, etc.) the pupil should derive by his own reasoning from examples, being directed by the questions of the teacher. Positive facts must, of course, first be stated directly; but after this, the pupils must be questioned about them, section by section, and must repeat them in a coherent manner.

Whatever in the study of natural history is to be observed in the objects of nature, the pupil himself, and not the teacher, should discover, point out, and state in words. In physics the pupil should learn to perform his own experiments and to find for himself by his own observation and thinking all he can discover. In geography, he should himself read from the maps the geographical objects and relations, should draw his own conclusions as to climate, trade, population, occupations of inhabitants,

Active participation more educative and more productive of interest.

etc. He should find out through his own estimation and comparison the relative magnitudes of countries (Africa about three times as large as Europe). Such a method of instruction is not only by far more educating than the passive acceptance of what the teacher offers ready-made, but it also goes much further towards quickening the interest, so much so that for the teacher to act contrary to this principle must be looked upon as a cardinal pedagogical sin.

Appropriate variety in method necessary.

In order to keep alive the pupil's interest in the instruction an appropriate variety must be provided, both as regards the method and the matter of instruction. The Latin proverb, "Variatio delectat," is especially applicable in the case of children, and the younger the pupils are, the more applicable it is. This demand is closely related to the didactic rule laid down above, since through the greatest possible active participation of the pupil, monotony is obviated most successfully, and variety and life are carried into the instruction.

The method of instruction may likewise be varied in a most desirable manner through the frequent use of objects for demonstration, such

as pictures, examples, etc.; through repeated application of the things learned to practical life; and by establishing as many relations as possible between different objects of instruction, as history, geography, etc. It is self-evident that in the selection and arrangement of the subjects and lessons provisions to this end must be made in the plans of instruction and in the schedules of lessons. Further discussions on this point, however, cannot find a place here, where we are concerned exclusively with the manner of teaching.

Importance of the teacher's personality.

Last and most important, the whole personality of the teacher as an individual has to be taken into consideration. Here not only the intellectual interest, but all kinds of interests indiscriminately are involved. On the personality of the teacher, on his characteristic manner of approaching and treating children, on the example which he gives them through his own conduct in school and out of school, depends, in the first place, the entire personal relation between child and teacher; on it depends whether or not the children meet him with respect, confidence, and love. This, again, is of vital importance

for the success of the instruction, as it directly affects the impression which his words make upon the child's mind; for there can be no doubt that the hearts of children open with much more cheerfulness, willingness, and susceptibility to the words of a teacher whom they love and esteem, than to the words of one they dislike. Besides, the entire tone of teaching,* on which so much depends in this respect, is most intimately connected with the personality of the teacher. "If feeling prompt it not, in vain you search for it!" † These words of Faust may most suitably be applied in the experiences of the teacher. In every instance, that teacher only will find the true life-inspiring tone of teaching who inwardly is full of life, and in whose heart lives whatever he teaches. To be sure, a certain outward animation of manner can be acquired and assumed by habit, but then it shares the lot of all that is "artificial"; it does not appeal to the heart; it may be entertaining, but it has not the power to

The attitude of the teacher.

* The whole attitude of the teacher in his instruction. —Ed.

† Goethe.

vivify. Where, however, a truly warm feeling and sincere animation dwell in the heart, there little art is required to cause such animation to appear outwardly and with that elementary force which "binds heart to heart." Every noble feeling of the teacher is then imparted to the hearts of the pupils. In these feelings lie, or, at least, are rooted those ideal interests which educational instruction has to cultivate as the foundation of every noble aspiration.

Active life as a source of interests.

In the foregoing we have tried to state briefly how *education* is able to awaken the nobler feelings of the child, and how, by doing so, it can contribute its share towards giving to the ideal interests the ascendency in the mental life of the child. However vital and important this effect of instruction appears to us, and much as it is to be regretted if instruction does not do its full duty in this respect, it cannot, on the other hand, be denied that active life, and above all the life in the family, exerts a deeper and more lasting influence upon the development of the child's interests than does instruction.

The influence of family life.

This fact finds its explanation in the intimate

relation between interest and feeling; the latter, as is quite natural, is more deeply and lastingly affected by the concrete forces of real life than by instruction, which can call forth those forces only by way of imitation. A single occurrence, the death of a dear relative, for example, or the mere sight of some great human misery, may so deeply affect the child's inner life that a life-long change of his interests may result therefrom. In like manner, the personal relations of the child, both in the family and outside of it, the whole tone and habit of life surrounding him, and especially the living example of those who educate him and associate with him, are of the greatest importance in this respect. To discuss what pedagogical conclusions might be drawn from this fact, and how especially those educational factors could be made most of within the family, would here be going too far.

Excessive cultivation of feeling.

We are at the end of our discussion, and it only remains to prevent a misconstruction to which the present treatise might give rise. From the close psychological relation of interest to the "emotional life," there inevitably re-

sulted the pedagogical demand that in order to give the ideal interests the ascendency in the child's mind, education should, to the best of its powers, cultivate the feelings with regard to those interests, should take them firmly in hand from the very beginning, and should give them every possible opportunity of expressing themselves in action. By this demand, let it be understood, we in no way speak in behalf of an excessive cultivation of feeling. The very common inclination towards misconstructions of this sort is far from finding its explanation in the actual nature of our system of education, which, on the contrary, to counterbalance its unduly preponderating cultivation of knowledge and of the intellect, emphatically calls for special stress to be laid on the factor of feeling. The explanation is rather to be sought in the fact that the psychological relation, which we make the basis of our demands, is as yet not sufficiently known and acknowledged. Whoever admits that relation must also approve of these demands, and the thought of the possibility of a pedagogical "exaggeration" along this line will not trouble him any more than do all the other

Attention to the factor of feeling.

cases where it is required to obtain valuable educational results through the cultivation of physical or mental powers. All excess is bad in the one respect as well as in the other. If in the interest of health and physical development frequent exercises of the body are demanded, the purport of this demand does not imply that an "excess" in this direction is expected of the body, or that it should be over-exerted, and not given the necessary rest. In this case illness of the body would result, or it would become enervated instead of gaining strength.

In the same manner the child's feelings would be impeded in their normal growth and the general health of his mental life would be injured by an excess of excitation. But this injurious effect of an "excess" is no more an argument against the reasonableness of the former demand than it is against the latter. The above illustration embodies a truth evident in itself, which would not need to be mentioned, if misrepresentations of the kind referred to did not again and again reflect discredit upon the principle enunciated.

Excess of excitation of feeling to be avoided.

Moreover, attention should here again be

called to the fact that interest, although it entirely grows out of feeling, and although it cannot, at any stage of its development, be wholly detached from the emotions, yet assumes by degrees the more objective form of the "judgment of value" in which the valuation becomes a matter of the intellect (compare p.). In accordance with this fact the demand made upon the educator that he ought to cultivate the ideal interests, includes not only the requirement that the nobler feelings should be aroused and excited again and again, but also that the impressions of value, originating in feeling, should by degrees be transformed into clear, true, faithful, and lasting judgments of value. This is a psychic process which, while depending throughout on feeling, presupposes active co-operation of the intellect on the part of the teacher as well as on that of the pupil.

Co-operation of the intellect.

Herewith the other objection is answered, that a doctrine of interest which takes feeling as the basis of everything lacks those firm ethical principles without which a moral character and a moral development of character is impossible. In those very judgments of value

lie such principles, and they alone actually imply in themselves all that is required of "principles of character." Growing out of the warm soil of the emotions, and even after formation being constantly refreshed by corresponding impressions of value through feeling, they possess for this reason, and for this reason alone, that motive power without which no principles of action can be conceived of; whereas purely doctrinal rules, which stand in no relation whatever to feeling, lack that power of actuation. As judgments, on the other hand, in which through the co-operation of the intellect everything that is vacillating and accidental in the single impressions of value received through feeling are balanced and their essential elements are condensed into objective definiteness and lasting validity, they possess throughout that attribute of firmness and stability which is rightly required of "principles of character." (Compare with this p. 24).

Principles of character.

The motive power of these principles.

That education, in order to accomplish its end, has to take other measures besides the cultivation of interest; that it must—especially by means of watching over the child, by the forma-

tion of habits, by discipline, etc.—weaken the impulses hostile to the good, must secure opportunity for the child to put into action his interests and desires directed towards the good, and must exercise him steadily in good actions—all this has already been expressed in another place.

Interest more powerful and lasting than discipline.

In conclusion, let it be once more most strongly emphasized that if, while observing such measures, the cultivation of interest is neglected, education misses the most essential part of its aim. It is true that, through the formation of habits, through discipline, etc., an outward aspect of good actions can be secured, even while from the heart of the pupil a corresponding interest does not come to the assistance of the educator; but for the very reason that it is forced, such actions neither have moral value nor will they outlive the compulsion to which they are due. Really lasting and actually valuable results, education can secure only when it constantly allows that more inward and ideal influence to go hand in hand with discipline and the formation of habits. This inner influence has as its aim to kindle in the hearts of young persons a lively interest for every-

thing that is good; for only from this interest does the will receive impulses towards a free choice of the good for its own sake, and only from this interest does it derive the power to remain faithful to the good, and even when the child has long outgrown the leading-strings of education. Rousseau was right, therefore, in saying that "true interest alone is the great mainspring which works long and surely."

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